Russia and Secularization: 
A Conceptualization of the Field of Research

Abstract

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The purpose of the article is to investigate the problem of success/failure of the complex process of secularization in Russia in the context of historical developments, especially the Reformation(s), and to propose a new conceptualization of the field of research. Within the scope of investigation, secularization is understood as the process of incessant production of knowledge that leads to progressive differentiation and distinction of various aspects of society on the level of macrostructures.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: There is a need to assess anew the linkage between the Reformation(s) as a prolonged process of questioning of all cultural formations (epistemes) and the particular historical settings in which they manifested themselves. According to model advanced by Bruno Latour, it can be said that Reformation(s) redefined the procedure of attaining knowledge by breaking the logic of procession and instituting the logic of network. Secularization became one of the key modules of reconstituting the knowledge/power relation within different epistemes. Russia has often been perceived as immutable and culturally mute entity.
“unto itself,” untouched by modernity, separate from the dominant Western *episteme*. This article presents a cognitivist perspective, based on the model of a double helix. It assumes the legitimacy of different narrations of modernity, which may differ in terms of practices of translation, but are still the active actors of the dynamic process of modern continuity and change, as exemplified by trajectories of Reformation(s).

**THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION:** First, the article defines the scope of investigation of secularization as the production of knowledge. Then it assesses where and how the “secular parable,” whose agent was Reformation(s), performed on large discursive fields of modernity – including its problematic relationship with the theory of modernization. Subsequently, the model of a double helix is presented as a heuristic tool for understanding the way by which the translation of Russia within the framework of modernity has taken place. Alternative models, like Enlightenment, Euroasianism (Gumilev, Dugin) are discussed within the context of the notion of altermodernity, as formulated by Nicolas Bourriaud. Then, the article assesses, in what way secularization in Russia, understood as a “cultural program” (S.N. Eisenstadt) had formed, over centuries, a heterogeneous text, responding to various temporalities.

**RESEARCH RESULTS:** The result is a proposal of a new conceptualization of the field of research as an interdisciplinary reading of mutuality of relations between Russia and secularization as a continuous translation of the structures of thought and knowledge of modernity in the contextual, historically grounded praxis of power/knowledge dynamics.

**CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:** Taking a cue from Polanyi’s “personal knowledge,” the research has aimed at depicting a new cognitive perspective that seriously takes into consideration the interdisciplinarity of knowledge.

Research on secularization and research on Russia tend to form two different spheres of scholarly activities, often weighted down by stereotypes. The stereotype about secularization is that it refers mainly to decreasing the religious aspect of social life, which development is associated with the emergence of modernity. As for Russia, the stereotype is that it does not participate in modernity at all. The article proposes a more productive way of relating Russia and secularization as a process of translating dispositifs of modernity in a contextual manner, that takes into consideration political dispositions, cultural traits, institutional practices and discontinuities of social development.

**Keywords:**
secularization, Russia, reformation, modernity
1. THE SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION:
SECULARIZATION AS THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE

Are there really true words, parables of the kingdom, of this very different (from Christian narrative – J.J.M.) kind? Does Jesus Christ speak through the medium of such words? The answer is that that the community which lives by the one Word of the one prophet Jesus Christ, and is commissioned and empowered to proclaim this Word of His in the world, not only may, but must accept the fact that there are such words and that it must hear them too, notwithstanding its life by this on Word and it commission to preach it. Naturally, there can be no question of words which say anything different from this one Word, but only of those which do materially say what it says, although from a different source and in another tongue. But can it ever pay sufficient attention to this one Word? Can it be content to hear it only from Holy Scripture and then from its own lips and in its own tongue? Should it not be grateful to receive it also from without, in very different human words, in a secular parable, even though it is grounded in and ruled by the biblical, prophetico-apostolic witness to this one Word? Words of this kind cannot be such as overlook or even lead away from the Bible. They can only be those which, in material agreement with it, illumine, accentuate, or explain the biblical witness in a particular time and situation, thus confirming it in the deepest sense by helping to make it sure and concretely evident and certain. They can only be words which will lead the community more truly and profoundly than ever before to Scripture. Has it any good reason to refuse this kind of stimulation (…)? (Barth, 2009, 4.3.1, p. 115).

When we use the term “secularization,” we enter, consciously or not, a contested territory. The possible definition of the term is of an extensive nature, as is shown by the typology proposed by John Sommerville.² In fact, the very concept of a “definition” has a scarce

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² He proposes the following “uses” or, “field of references” for the term: “When discussing macro social structures, secularization can refer to differentiation: a process in which the various aspects of society, economic, political, legal, and moral, become increasingly specialized and distinct from one another.”

When discussing individual institutions, secularization can denote the transformation of a religious into a secular institution. Examples would be the evolution of institutions such as Harvard University from a predominantly
utility here, except serving as a heuristic “field of reference” for the research.

Within this “field of reference” we can encounter the narrow definition of Peter L. Berger, according to whom secularization is “a process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Pfadenhauer, With Selected Essays by Berger, 2013, p. 56). Within the Sommervillian typology, this definition would fall in-between the categories referring to mentalities and population, which in itself shows the ambiguous nature of the very enterprise of defining secularization on any lesser plane than the macroscale.

Sommerville’s first “use,” or, as we propose, “field of reference” is “differentiation: a process in which the various aspects of society, economic, political, legal, and moral, become increasingly specialized and distinct from one another.” This is a process that happens, or does not happen, on the level of macrostructures.

And if we return to Karl Barth’s concern as expressed in the above passage, it is obvious that, when he speaks about secularization, he is not all that much interested in issue of supposed negative effects of the transposition or transference of authority from the sacred to the secular, nor is he annoyed by the decline of religious feelings. He also does not care about the perceived loss of dominance of the religious institutions and symbols within sectors of society – an issue that moves Peter Berger so much. Barth dismisses, without doing it

religious institution into a secular institution (with a divinity school now housing the religious element illustrating differentiation).

When discussing activities, secularization refers to the transfer of activities from religious to secular institutions, such as a shift in provision of social services from churches to the government.

When discussing mentalities, secularization refers to the transition from ultimate concerns to proximate concerns. E.g., individuals in the West are now more likely to moderate their behavior in response to more immediately applicable consequences rather than out of concern for post-mortem consequences. This is a personal religious decline or movement toward a secular lifestyle.

When discussing populations, secularization refers to broad patterns of societal decline in levels of religiosity as opposed to the individual-level secularization of (4) above. This understanding of secularization is also distinct from (1) above in that it refers specifically to religious decline rather than societal differentiation (Sommerville, 1998).
overtly, with the gesture of the Seigneur, the whole annoyance about diminishing influence of religion in society. It is his deepest conviction “that everything depends wholly and utterly upon the Word of God in Christ” (Barth, 2009, IV 3.1, p. 22), and that “No Prometheanism can be effectively maintained against Jesus Christ” (Barth, 2009, p. 119). With such a rock-like certainty, he does not see any necessity in taking interest in what to him are trifle issues, like for example, the issue of divine omnipotence (potentia absoluta Dei) being transposed into secular powers-that-be\(^3\) (either absolute or democratic). What he cares about is the Word’s presence in the field of knowledge, and its relation to secular discourse. He approaches it with a precise commitment:\(^4\) for him, Jesus Christ is the source, ground, and goal of all creation. The Incarnation is the epoch-creating event that denies, by its very happening, any need for philosophical or theological speculation about teleology of being. Incarnation is not a mirror of our efforts at understanding the Godhead in an absolute sense. We are \textit{incapax Dei} – incapable of understanding God, neither in recalling him by speculative means of philosophical investigation nor by exercising our historical memory through some sort of institutional mandate. This frees us from the overwhelming balast of culturally-induced reflex of “annotating” God, and the attempts to dominate the discoursive space. As Barth sees it, accepting Incarnation releases us towards acting in a secular world without a chip on our shoulder. We do not have to hide our faith, we speak of it openly, but at the same time we do not have to denigrate the secular expressions of

\[^{3}\text{This problem of transposition of sacred into secular has been one of the lines of development in the discourse of modernity, from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt and Hans-Georg Gadamer. It has absorbed the thoughts of many philosophers and theologians on the account of perceived danger to salvation as the ultimate meaning of human existence, by locating it in man-made structures, like modern absolutist state or liberal democracy. Thus the notion of “transposition” is not a neutral one, but value-laden.}\]

\[^{4}\text{By stating openly our ground, but with respect to the environment we are in, we do not put ourselves necessarily at a disadvantage. In the contemporary understanding of knowledge, (presented most fully by Polanyi, 1958), a really game-changing forms of knowledge come about as results of personal commitments. We have entered the post-postivist understanding of science, that appreciates the personal dimension of knowledge-creating and sees it as indispensable element of the discovery processes.}\]
modernity. Since we no longer try to create Deity in our own image, we do not have to be afraid of any iconoclastic temptations on the part of the secular world. On the contrary, since we do not have, as partisans of the Incarnation, any interest in maintaining the presence of the false gods among us, we can only applaud their overthrow, if a need arises.

By keeping our commitment to Incarnation while at the same time rejecting the vestiges of speculative approach and a sinful desire to manipulate God, we can become actively involved in the processes of acquiring, disseminating, sharing and multiplying knowledge, understood as an incessant human activity of dynamic “knowing,” according to Karl Polanyi.

As fragile beings, humans have forever been in the business of “gaming” the world, of competing with elements, with nature, for survival, in order to extend and sustain the meaning of our lives beyond the “limes” of our bodily extinction. This is what has driven humanity from times immemorial. In its base form, “gaming” can attain the undesirable garb of speculative thinking presented as transmitting “tradition” and thus manipulating the Creator – an activity so clearly condemned by Barth. It does not rely on the Word, but, as writes Bruno Latour, on “the community of saints” (Latour, 2001, p. 15). This organically growing kind of organization of knowledge functions in such a way that:

The intensity of the revelation is proportional to the layering, the multiplication, the piling, the redoubling of mediators. (...) The logic of procession (on which this community is based – J.J.M.) does not progress, except in intensity; it is afraid of innovation even though it continually keeps on inventing; it endeavors not to repeat tediousness, even though it continually keeps on repeating the same rituals. (...) It layers intermediaries, it does not capitalize on them. It likes above all to establish correspondences, saturate with transversal liaisons the different messages amassed in the course of time. It likes to purify the

5 One remark: when he speaks of “councils, congregations, canonical law,” etc., he refers obviously to the Church before King Henry the VIII’s break with Rome. But the intention of applicability is much broader. Any community of saints, as he understands them, whether ecclesiastical in nature or extra ecclesiastical (though not yet secular in modern sense) are vulnerable to the sort of protocols of transmission he describes so vividly.
message continually, but each purification becomes a new treasure that is added to the sacred repository and enriches it, complicates it further. It likes to make the message more precise, but this sets in motion, each time, councils, sessions of tribunals, congregations, that accumulate still more points of doctrine, theology, and canonical law, and complicate even further the movement of the message (Latour, 2001).

This is a very codified and philosophically precise way of “gaming” the reality by means of supposedly purified and faithful transmission. With every new translation, the farther from the original source, the message, by analogy with the modern photography, can be said to gain more of the quality of the extreme high resolution. In such a way a tradition, by way of neo-traditionalization, becomes a matter of aesthetics, a mannerist mode of forming an order and keeping control. The thing is, though, that those dimensions of power, deprived of the productive relation with knowledge, become stale and useless. Knowledge, on the other hand, becomes an object too precious to tinker with: “In this system of translation, one can remain faithful either through daring invention or through repetitive transmission and one can betray through tedious repetition as well as through careless innovation” (Latour, 2001). It is thus limited to paddling around in a small pond with a staid water. At some point, though, the stale, circular, elliptical form of mannerist knowledge, has to be broken if the knowledge/power relations are to be restored in order to be socially productive. Reformation(s), with its return to original sources and obvious distaste, if not disdain, for all kinds of mannerisms, was historically the pivotal actor that had to break the circularity of faux knowledge and the resistance of the existing “communities of saints” with their monopolies on transmitting and translating knowledge.

Reformation(s) was the Kuhnian paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962), in a sense that it redefined the procedure of attaining knowledge, breaking with the logic of procession and introducing the logic of network, with new protocols. Multiplicity of of layers of mediators

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6 The paradigm, in Kuhn’s thinking, does not refer just to the current theory, but the all-encompassing landscape of beliefs, convictions, prejudices, of which it is a part.
was replaced by the capitalization of mediations and gaining knowledge meant new information and not a different repetition of the same message. The message as such started to be treated as a piece of information in contrast to the previous mode of identification of message with the messenger.7

There is a tendency in public discourse to associate the growth in knowledge with the Enlightenment.8 Certainly, the period of Enlightenment represents the mature stage of modernity’s search for knowledge understood as series of social practices of accumulation and gathering, as well as accessing, classifying and experimenting – that is the beginning of scientific enterprise as social force to be reckoned with. In the various debates on the “legitimacy of the modern age”9 there is an abrupt jump from the medieval times to the Enlightenment, as if nothing had happened in between.

But it was actually the Reformation(s)10 that was the crucible of the Polanyi’s “knowing” as an emerging social practice – there is could be observed in statu nascendi as a prolonged process of questioning of all past cultural formations (epistemes):11 of antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance as well as the structures of power that kept them

7 The matrix of differences between the logic of procession and the logic of network is explicated by Latour in “On a crucial difference…”, p. 18.

8 Although it was none other than Barth himself who wrote that “it is notable that in the whole history of ideas there is hardly a single verdict which verbally corresponds so closely to the Christian verdict as that of 18th Century’s optimism” (Church Dogmatics III,1). Quoted in: Rose, 2016, p. 36.

9 This is, for example, the case with the most important of these debates, namely that between Karl Löwith and Hans Blumenberg. For the nature of the debate, see: McKnight, 1990.

10 We use the singular/plural at the same time due to the tendency in the historical research that perceives Reformation(s) as a process, extended in time, that had been undergoing multiple transformations under the influences of many social, political, as well as geographical, often interlocking, factors. The examples of this new type of research are the books by Marshall, 2009; MacCulloch, 2003 and Wallace, 2012. The contradictory view like the one espoused by, for example, Johnson, 1976, that delineates the beginning of a Reformation, as a one-off event, at 1517, with the emergence of Luther, that ends it in 1563 at the Council of Trent, is very rare in current research.

11 According to Michel Foucault “In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested
alive through the ages, and also the ideological assumptions that undergirded them. Reformation(s) affirmed that the real Incarnation of the Truth, the Good and Beauty had taken place only once, in human flesh, in the person of Jesus Christ. By this gesture, it dismissed the naturalistic concern with discovering those attributes as independent, separate substances, somehow laying around for the picking by devoted metaphysicians, who could assess their discursive weight. The Truth, The Good and Beauty, if looked for beyond the fact of the Incarnation, as autonomous entities, can not be more reliable guides to achieving knowledge than The Lie, the Evil and the Ugliness.

The Reformation(s) as a new emerging *episteme* had to work out a way of “knowing,” through constructing new rationality, while at the same time having to deal with the practices of late medieval period that still had the disciplining power over society and the individual and that coexisted along each other in a less and less comfortable way.

If Reformation(s) is often painfully absent from the discourse about the emergence of modernity, the reason may be that it is this period of uncertainty, when the vestiges of the past are still present in the new forms, where lines of the epistemic divisions are not yet fully clarified. This is a moment in history where everything is possible, but at the same time there is this strange connection between the inescapable logic of the evolution that points to the victory of the Reform (in various guises) on one hand, but a sort of “accidentality” on the other, that can cause its sudden fall, because it so much

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12 The effects of such discipline was seen in the fates of John Hus, Giordano Bruno and Girolamo Savonarola. But it was also seen in a society-at-large, experiencing a change in its image of the world, that often resulted in switching religious allegiances to new religious movements, which was, in turn, punished by those in power, eclesiastical and secular.

13 The paramount example is an uneasy relation between the Renaissance’s *episteme* and the Reformation’s *episteme*: “The Renaissance *episteme* not only made coexistence of what, for us, are rational arguments, erudition and magic, it also made impossible to distinguish them as different from knowledge, since they all relied on the same principle of organization. The prose of the world was formed as an infinite text binding together world and things through resemblance.” Oksala, 2005, p. 24. See also: Barnes, 2016.
depends on circumstances or some personal reversal of fortunes in
the life of key players. Such a complicated picture does not lend
itself easily to a linear, progressive narration. And thus it is much
easier to go straigth from Middle Ages to the Enlightenment.

14 MacCulloch describes, for example the case of Reginald Pole, exiled to Italy
from England in wake of his support of Catherine of Aragon against her
husband, King Henry VIII. At the time Italian humanist circles were very
much influenced by the ideas of an early reformers like P. Valdes. Reginald
Pole joined that group. While fully in agreement with Valdes and Luther
about the central role of grace in Christian life, he nevertheless wanted to
keep the emerging reform ideas within the strictures of the Catholic Church.
That brought him to the attention of Pope Paul III (Alessandro Farnese) who
bestowed on him the the Cardinal’s hat, along with other men from the
reform circle (Cantarini, Sadoleto, Carafa, Fisher). Some of them were even
appointed by the Pope to a special Commission on reforming the Church.
It came to the point, that at the moment of Paul III death in 1549, that was
preceded by the crisis of 1542, when many Italian evangelicals no longer
considered themselves in union with the Bishop of Rome, Reginald Pole was
seen as the person that could stop the authoritarian turn in Church policies.
He became the favourite candidate to replace the dead Pope, who recom‑
mended him on his deathbed. He was the magnet for reformers within the
Catholic Church, a person with great authority. Nevertheless in a dramatic
conclave, he was losing, first by 4 votes to the majority on the fist ballot,
Then Cardinal Carafa, no longer reform-minded, waved papers that were to
prove that Pole was a heretic. Pole still fought. And this time he came 1 vote
short. And then the Conclave, one of the longest in history, went on and on.
Pole, a thoughtful humanist that he was, seemed less and less interested in
continuing the fight. He did not seize the hour that was evidently his, and
lost. The new Pope became Julius III, a man without a vision of reform. As
writes MacCulloch: „In the Cardinals’ vote which elected Julius on 8th Fe‑
bruary 1550, the last chance passed away for a Reformation such as Erasmus
had sought.” (MacCulloch, 2003, pp. 214-215 and 236-237). There is a hint
of wistfullness here, for we can only imagine, how the Reformation’s fate
would look like if Reginald Pole became the Pope.

15 And such a linear, progressive narration is convenient for both sides of the
debate on the legitimacy of modern age. For the proponents of Enlighten‑
ment as a triumphant moment of humanity that discarded the limitations of
religion, Reformation is a strange, hybrid entity – not fully medieval but not
fully modern either. For the Enlightenment’s agonistes, while Reformation
is this tipping point that dethroned religion from its rightful place, it was
nevertheless only a stepping stone to its full delegitimization effected by the
Enlightenment. Thus, it is “devil’s apprentice,” but not the devil himself.
What can be the most irksome to all involved in this debate, is the fact that
Reformation distanced itself from the problem of legitimacy. Its implicit
understanding was that what happens legitimizes itself.
To use contemporary conceptual framework, Reformation(s) can be seen as an era of disruption,\textsuperscript{16} while Enlightenment as a period of consolidation.

The form of secularization that arose out of the Reformation(s) could not have been immune to the demands of disruption.

Up to this point, historically, we could have been observing and speaking of the particular articulations of secularizations, that could broadly be put in the category of secularizing individual institutions, activities and mentalities, as enumerated by Sommerville.\textsuperscript{17} Those articulations, at the intersections of various structures and mental convictions, were still experiencing birthpains, and could not yet reach the level of macroorganization, defined by Sommerville as “differentiation.”

With entering the period of Reformation(s), dispersed secularizing impulses and individual articulations of various secular intimations, that could light up in one place and then fast die down, became a performative act of history.

\textsuperscript{16} “Clayton M. Christensen (1997) saw that the problem was the velocity of history, and it wasn’t so much a problem as a missed opportunity, like a plane that takes off without you, except that you didn’t even know there was a plane, and had wandered onto the airfield, which you thought was a meadow, and the plane ran you over during takeoff. Manufacturers of mainframe computers made good decisions about making and selling mainframe computers and devising important refinements to them in their R. & D. departments – ‘sustaining innovations’, Christensen called them –but, busy pleasing their mainframe customers, one tinker at a time, they missed what an entirely untapped customer wanted, personal computers, the market for which was created by what Christensen called ‘disruptive innovation’: the selling of a cheaper, poorer-quality product that initially reaches less profitable customers but eventually takes over and devours an entire industry”. (Jill Lepore, 2014). When we apply this scheme to the Reformation(s), we see immediately that it is such a “disruptive innovation” in the intellectual life of the West, with creating a religious market for series of individualistic narratives and personal responses to concerns of the people looking for new answers within the context of turbulent history that often traumatized them. Thus, while the previous \textit{epistemes} were functionally the keepers of the „mainframe,” so to speak, in the end they had to leave the scene in order to make the place for the „disrupting innovator”which was the Reformation.

\textsuperscript{17} See footnote 1.
When Karl Barth writes, in the best Reformation spirit, about the possibility of “secular parable” (Barth, 2009, 4.3.1, p. 115), and adds that the secular words cannot overlook or lead away from the Bible, it is quite clear, that he does not do it to admonish the secular “words” as distinct from the “Word.” His statement has a value of performative utterance: the words of secular parable “can only be those,” and not in any way other, that “illumine, accentuate or explain” the Bible witnessing of “particular time and situation” and make it “concretely evident and certain.”

According to J.L. Austin: “performatives go right or wrong by being felicitous or infelicitous” (Austin, 1979, p. 246), which show their historical contingences in terms of either allegiance or dissonance with the given episteme. Depending on the exigences of their knowledge/power relations they either can strengthen/weak en articulations that already exist in the discursive field, or they can call them into the being.

We can thus legitimately ask, calling on the particular exigences (culture, networking capacity, etc.), where and how the “secular parable,” whose agent was the Reformation(s), performed on large discursive fields of modernity.

When assessing the trajectory of the notion of secularization in terms of the degree of either the “felicitousness” or the “infelicitousness” of its relation with the reigning episteme, it was, in a sense, “infelicitous,” that the attempted theory of secularization was joined at the hip with the theory of modernization within the linear, seamless, seamless, seamless...

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18 In the philosophy of language and speech acts theory, performative utterances are sentences which are not only describing a given reality, but also changing the social reality they are describing. As such, they are, in a broad sense, expressions of Polanyi “personal knowledge,” operating within in the framework of knowledge/power axis as depicted by Foucault.

19 According to Giddens, modernization encompasses “modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence.” (Giddens, 1991). When it first appeared on the scene, in the 50’s and 60’s, the theory of modernization attempted to serve the research community the explanation of the diffusion of Western styles of living, technological innovations and individualist types of communication and achievement into other cultures. It thus reflected, along with its research aims, a certain political objective of extending the Western cultural values and political
non-problematic narration. In this crude model, modernization was the tool of bringing prosperity and opportunity, and thus, by its concentration on material values and “this worldly” lifestyles, was somehow initiating a secularizing “culture shift.” There were two basic shortcomings of this approach: first, its approach toward secularization was based on its understanding as effecting “emancipation” from religion and religious institutions and/or sentiments, and not a mechanism oriented toward achieving autonomous “differentiation.” That had an effect of putting secularization squarely into the bracket of religion/non-religion category, thus limiting its understanding as that of a larger process of reaching specialization and distinctiveness by various social segments. Secularization, understood in such a way, together with the modernization theory, falls within the classical evolutionary paradigm of understanding reality. This paradigm reflects the constant striving of the human mind for an equilibrium of a given reality with rationality (variously defined), which is seen as the natural source of human activity. When we notice a lack of such an equilibrium, we tend to ascribe it to some deficiency in our knowledge or at least a lack of dexterity in our operational thinking. The realities that induce our epistemological discomfort tend to be ignored or marginalized by various techniques, like historicization or epistemological rationalizations. Although the

institutions to the rest of the world. The second wave of modernization theory, that emerged in the 70’s and 80’s, was a sort of a reaction to that initial form, and as such, a part of the critical theory. It criticized the influence of Western modernization elsewhere as a reflection of Western cultural and economic imperialism or dominance. The third wave of modernization theory arose in the 1990s as the theory of late-, high- or post modernity. It tried to be more neutral, being not in favor or against Western modernization. Rather it attempts to unearth the contradictions in the modernization process and to explain its consequences in individualistic terms, for example of „disembedding” of human beings from their environment, when their experience the loss of their identity. This last wave coincides with the rising fortunes of post-secular theory, as exemplified by the names of Charles Taylor, Marcel Gauchet, Jean-Luc Nancy, or, in his late years, Jurgen Habermas.

20 Here the example was the influential study by Inglehart, 1990.

21 This narrowing of the scope of secularization to religion-related conceptual field, resulted later in making it easier to critics of “post-secular” persuasion to establish their claim that secularization is, at its roots, a matter of deprivation of human being of their natural identity, which is inescapably religious.
ostensible aim of utilizing such techniques is to “discover” the supposed equilibrium, what they achieve, in fact, is an epistemological collusion, at best, when we agree that a certain equilibrium is present, because it should be there. The “discovery” that modernization and secularization go hand in hand was such a collusion. But this classical evolutionism is of a limited value. As we know from S.N. Eisenstadt:

social evolution is neither to be examined with the model of equilibrium between the components of structural differentiation, nor is it to be examined as an ideal equilibrium which is expected to be descriptive for the direction of evolutionary change. On the contrary, the structural evolutionary change is a change which is paradoxical, full of tensions, conflicts and revolutions which cannot be controlled as a whole and in their continuation.22

Thus, the discontinuities in historical developments are to be expected and also normalized in discourse – instead of being treated as exceptional, and thus in a sense, denaturalized, outside of the scope of historical understanding, except in the „historicized” and rationalized versions. But they should not be treated as dichotomies, chasms that have to be necessarily overcome. We have to learn to live with discontinuities as part and parcel of history and social change.

The second shortcoming was equally consequential: it was identifying modernization with one type of modernity, as defined by the first wave of the theory (see footnote 14). And even if the second and the third wave tried to distance themselves from the most glaringly ineffective outcomes of such identification, they still were imprisoned in an „iron cage” of conceptualization that they basically could only bang themselves against.23 One of the symptoms of such imprisonment within closed categories is in the very definition of modernization by Giddens (see footnote 18), which rigidly, and arbitrarily, delineates the beginning of modernity as the 17th Century. This is the same case as with the beginning of Reformation(s), which to a not so


23 The dominance of the field by the original cast of modernization theory was such, that both the critical theory, Marxist in original, or the analysis of post-modernity, associated with its outgrowth in the form of „post-secularity”, could only survive and thrive purely as a reactionary gesture, while still being within the same parental lineage.
long ago, was dated, in an overly precise way, at 1517. But, as we have become to appreciate in recent decades, there was not one, concise, limited in duration event as a singular Reformation, but there were plural, extended in time and form, manifestations of series of historical events that we can call Reformation(s). In the same way, on a much grander scale, encompassing a much larger swath of time, there could not be anything like a singular Modernity. Again, there are various series of events, historical anomalies, parallel developments that at some point could diverge, that we could call multiple Modernities (with a capital M, if we so desire). As writes Jose Casanova:

The multiple modernities position rejects both the notion of a modern radical break with traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition. All traditions and civilizations are radically transformed in the processes of modernization, but they also have the possibility of shaping in particular ways the institutionalization of modern traits. Traditions are forced to respond and adjust to modern conditions, in the process of reformulating their traditions for modern contexts, but they also help to shape the particular forms modernity (Casanova, 2006, p. 14).

2. A DOUBLE HELIX: RUSSIA IN TRANSLATION

When assessing the trajectory of modernity, in all its guises, across various historical context, we should disclaim the easy classifications

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24 The term first introduced by Eisenstadt: “The notion of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to (...) explain the history of modernity is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of multiplicity of cultural programs” (Eisenstadt, 2000, p. 2). The usage of the world “presumes” denotes the fact that Eisenstadt very much understands that, with the loss of the idea of equilibrium, our understanding of social formation, or whole epochs, like modernity, can have mostly a heuristic value. They do not possess a clearly identifiable limes, when it comes to beginnings and ends within the historical frameworks. His use of a notion of “cultural programs” points to an expansive understanding of human endeavours in all their complexity and differentiation. It could not be replaced with a narrower notions like “religion” or “social ideas” or “political interests,” without losing the central claim of epistemological equality of differing political, spiritual, social, political, and cultural submissions, what Eisenstadt summarily, but quite consciously, calls “programs.”
that form the part of our Enlightenment’s heritage, but are, in fact, exclusionary in nature. Cultures are not either modern or not – the dichotomy does not hold for the simple reason that we are all engulfed in modernity. There is no other way of being than being modern. Those who deny this, tend to replace the inclusionary discourse on modernity, from within the modernity itself, by the civilizational approach. It may seem paradoxical, and a little bit shocking, but there could be some common sensibility detected in the writers, who could not be, one would assume, farther from each other, in terms of historical placement and cultural affiliations, like, for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Samuel P. Huntington. Despite all the differences, what is common to them, is the civilizational narrative based on the figure of “(ig)noble savage.” Rousseau sees him (her?) as the best embodiment of human development (Rousseau, 1754), while in Huntington’s taxonomy of civilizations (Huntington, 1993), there is a deeply hidden figure of “ignoble savage,” issuing the ultimatum to the Western civilization. Whether in the sunny and optimistic way of Russeau, or the dark and pessimistic take of Huntington, the “civilizational” model of human development is less an effect of dispassionate analysis, than an expression of a certain anthropological approach, intimately connected with the deep assimilation of the

25 Classification, as a tool of developed scientific worldview, was an outgrowth of the Enlightenment, but was quite alien to Reformation. The most crude explanation here would be based on the atheistic orientation of the first case and the assumed place of the religious values in the second. But the most probable reason was that scientific approach was still in the early stages during Reformation(s), while in the Enlightenment it reached a full-blown legitimacy, and classification was one of the most important, if not obsessive, techniques of research.

26 Later the author republished it in an extended version (Huntington, 2011). It is important to add a distinction, that while for Rousseau, the savage is noble, because he lives in a state of nature, in Huntington’s worldview, those who we may call “ignoble savages,” are a product of the lessening of ties to their identity. This does not solve the problem, however, essential to his analysis, whether that original identity, if located in different civilization than Western, is on pair with, or is it of a lower taxonomical order. This issue was debated extensively following the appearance of Huntington’s book. It is collected in The Clash of Civilizations? A Debate (Huntington, 1999). On this point, it contains a trenchant critiques by Fuad Adjami and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, as well as other important contributions.
notions of cultural alienation and the foreignness of the Other. In its pessimistic version it leads to the overdetermination of significance of dividing lines, limes, frontiers – various names for introducing exclusionary practices.

As wrote Fuad Adjami in this critique of Huntington’s thesis:

Huntington has found his civilizations whole and intact, watertight under an eternal sky. Buried alive, as it were, during the years of the Cold War, these civilizations (Islamic, Slavic-Orthodox, Western, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, etc.) rose as soon as the stone was rolled off, dusted themselves off and proceeded to claim the loyalty of their adherents. (But) civilizations have always seemed messy creatures. Furrows run across whole civilizations, across individuals themselves – that was modernity’s verdict. But Huntington looks past all that. The crooked and meandering alleyways of the world are straightened out. With a sharp pencil and a steady hand Huntington marks out where one civilization ends and the wilderness of “the other” begins (Adjami, in: Huntington, 1999, p. 33-34).

If we want to get out of this “civilizational” conundrum, we have to adopt, when confronted with the supposed “Other,” the model of a double helix, which is characterized by the presence of a pair of congruent helices with the same axis, differing by a translation along the axis. In adopting this model, it is essential that we dispense with the preconceived notions about the the trajectory of development of the helices and the timing of its particular stages: the helices may be congruent, but they are not identical. We have to be prepared to be surprised, startled, and sometimes even baffled.

Reformation(s), as a Kuhnian paradigm shift, creates new protocols of modernity in line of the logic of network. Secularization is one of such protocols, Thus, in the same way that the Reformation(s) cannot be treated as an exclusively religious event, but rather as a knowledge-inducing formation, secularization’s main concern is not with depleting the existing religious resources and depriving the populations of their cherished myths, ways of imagining the thereafter or communitarian religious sentiments, but rather with effecting the new ways of differentiation and distinction in macro-scale.

The point of contention comes when, consciously or not, often for polemical reasons, we mix the macro and micro scales. What is a differentiation of knowledge in macro-scale, becomes, all of a sudden,
on another level of analysis, a disintegration of religious beliefs. Although, of course, there is no denying, that a strong transformation of convictions and beliefs about the world and its appearances accompanies the prolonged process of differentiation.

When analysing this process in terms of behaviour of a double helix, we have to be careful not to give in to temptation of mixing these levels of analysis. Only when staying firmly within the scope of the macro-scale analysis, we can avoid being entangled onto the slippery slope of “civilizational” heuristics of Sameness/Otherness dichotomy.27

All these reservations are in order when tackling the complex problem of secularization in Russia,28 which country, its trajectory of development, and its self-image has been a source of bafflements to many generations of researchers.29

27 A good review of images, often quite bizarre, of Russia as a construct of Western imagination is presented in a paper by Iver B. Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other, European University Institute and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (no date given), https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6538476.pdf.. See also, of the same author (1993). Russia as Central Europe’s Constituting Other. East European Politics & Societies, March, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 349-369.

28 We have to be sensitive with the terminology here. When we use, for the purposes of this text, the term “secularization in Russia,” we understand it in accordance with Sommerville’s “uses,” as a term referring to macro-scale process of differentiation. The other term, although similarly looking, refer to different uses. “Russia’s secularization” would point to historical and political, chronologically oriented, transfers of activities from religious to secular spheres, including the secularization of institutions. That would historically refer, for example, to the reforms of Peter the Great, Communist forcible „desacralization” of public spaces, as well as the internal developments in the Orthodox Church, like the Patriarch Nikon reforms and its consequence in the form of “raskol” (split) in the 17th Century. The third use, “Russian secularization,” embraces discursively and descriptively, what Sommerville calls the “transition from ultimate concerns to proximate concerns” on the part of the population. And this is the level of usage, when a discourse on disintegration of beliefs, or other similar sociological or psychological causes of decline of religious affiliation and increase in adopting secular mode of living (understood as dissociated from churchly affiliation) can find its proper place.

29 These bafflements have come from what we may call one Ur-conviction, stemming from the „civilizational” paradigm; that holds that Russia is different in principle, that it does not share the civilizational qualities expected
For the Western imagination, which has deeply absorbed the Reformation(s) both as a (often politically and culturally divisive) religious event and the prolonged process differentiation, Russia, perceived as this Eternal Other, had always been an epistemological challenge. In the West, the territory of knowledge and matter, mind and spirit was always contested, accepting various degrees of separation, even before the formal differentiation – a result of secularization – has occurred. In Russia, on the other hand, there always existed an unshakable conviction about the potential sacrality of the matter, unity and sanctity of the whole creation and the calling of man to participation in its final transfiguration. (...) Matter revealed itself as a spiritual principle, as a living and responsibility-carrying participant of a great drama of human fall and redemption. A human being incarnated in himself this organic reciprocity of body and spirit. (...) The development of Russian culture was stimulated by a drive to find a key to a mystery of a complex nature of man and his place in a cosmic life (Ziernow, 2015, p. 311, 312).

It is a fact, that nothing could be more antithetical to the style of thought inspired by the Reformation(s). Since we have established of a “normal country” due to its historical development and a type of home grown culture, alien in its specificity, thus closing it in a convenient box of assumed Otherness. This is a typical example of what Foucault called “normalization discourse,” which refers negatively some development or phenomenon to an ideal-type, rarely precise, in order to place that phenomenon on the discursive periphery. The example of such a thinking can be found in Feliks Koneczny, a somewhat precursor of Huntington, who in his odd classification of civilizations, put Russia as one of the manifestations of the Turanian civilization.

30 The book was originally published in English in London, by Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd. in 1963. It was later translated into Russian. The Polish translation from the Russian is by Henryk Paprocki. Translation in this text is mine, based on the Polish edition.

31 It is thus, in a sense, an interesting morcel of history, that the Ziernow’s book was written for, as says the author, the “Anglican friends” of the “Cerkiew” (Russian Church). He describes in rich and interesting details the ecumenical efforts of the young Russian members of the Orthodox Church, so called “Living Church”, under the auspices of student movement who in the 20s and 30s of the XX Century tried to establish a forum of cooperation with the the Anglican Church and the World Council of Churches. One of the
that it was Reformation(s) that was the source of Western modernity, it is no wonder that the West,\textsuperscript{32} when looking at Russia with its cosmological, unity and transfiguration-oriented imaginarium, has found it difficult to detect any intimations of existence of a counterpart for secularization. On the other hand, the Russian thinkers, even of a progressive, “liberal” attitude, in the mold of Bulgakov and his peers, did not help either, by their constant recalling of the separateness of Russia, the exclusivity of “Russian values,” etc. One of the major obstacles in this realm was an insistence on the continuity of historical development of Russia as an entity that “gathers the lands” but cannot manage in an organized and peaceful way a potential devolution of a unitarian government and is not able to discursively accept the existence of a discontinuation of a particular form of statehood. And this despite the historical trajectory of development that included many discontinuations. It was noticed by two great authorities of Russian Orthodoxy. Father G. Florovski wrote: “History of Russian culture is full of interruptions, storms, renunciations, most involved leaders in that movement was Father Sergei Bulgakov. See Chapter X “Spotkanie z chrześcijańskim Zachodem” (Encounter with the Christian West) in Ziernow’s book, p. 278-311. Although the Bulgakov’s project has proven of a limited long-term valency, there exist, though, some currents within the contemporary Russian Church that wants to continue this not much-remembered tradition. Mikhail Sergeev, who self-identifies himself as “liberal Orthodox” discerns two strands in the Orthodox thought in Russia, the “renewal” and the „revival”. The first one accepts the notion that Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestantism are “roots and fruits of the same tree”, while the second is, by principle, hostile to Protestantism. He identifies the “renewal” with the names of Bulgakov, Solovev and Berdyaev, while the “revival” with the name of Khomyakov and with the persistent Slavophilic tendencies in the Russian Church. (Sergeev, 2004). There is, though, an important difference with the Bulgakov’s pre-war project and the Sergeev’ one. Bulgakov and his circle spoke with the representatives of the mainline Western churches at the high point of their moral strenght. Sergeev’s proposed dialogue, if exists at all, it is rather with the Evangelical churches that do not carry the same weight, as mainline churches did in the past. They are in a sense, mismatched, for the “liberal Orthodoxy” finds a counterpart in very conservative Western Protestantism.

\textsuperscript{32} When the word “West” is used, it is by way of a heuristic device, assimilating the popular usage, and it shall not be constructed as as an ontological statement.
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passions, disappointments, betrayals and splits\(^{33}\) (Florovski, 1937, p. 500). Also, in view of N. Berdayev “Russian culture’s characteristics is discontinuity\(^{34}\)” (Bierdajew, 1999, p. 9). And in N. Ziernow’s sober assessment:


Russian religious continuity is in stark contrast with catastrophic transformations in life of the state. Liberty-loving and anarchy-prone Kievan and Novgorod Rus, stale and heavy Muscovy, stately St.Petersburg empire, the socialist soviet republic (…) – they are not stages of uninterrupted development. They seem the mutually antithetical political creatures, which just happened to had come into existence on the same territory, populated by the same nation (Ziernow, 2015, p. 350).

Inasmuch as Ziernow puts vividly the dilemma that comes with the negation of Russia’s historical development, he nevertheless takes for granted what he calls “Russian religious continuity,” what means, in fact, the domination of the Orthodox hierarchical order. The Russian religious sphere did not have a chance to experiment with discontinuity, and its beneficial effects (in contrast with the Reformation(s), that allowed for the transitory chaos that it involved, but then the chaotic transformations have evolved into various forms of mature religious pluralism). There were two such notable attempts at experimentation, one within the Orthodox Church, propelled by internal dissent, and one that came into being at its margin. The first one was the raskol (split) effected by the traditionalist resistance to the reforms of Patriarch Nikon in the 17th Century, that ended in the insurgency of the Old Believers (raskolnikovs). While protesting against the heavy-handiness and arbitrariness of Nikon and the ecclesiastical authorities in introducing the reforms, that originally were designed as a return to the Greek sources and were to lead to purification of faith, the Old Believers could not have become a potential for real reforms in the Church, due to their resistance to all changes.\(^{35}\)

\(^{33}\) Quoted in: Ziernow, 2015, p. 349.

\(^{34}\) Quoted in: ibidem.

\(^{35}\) For the explanation of the controversy, see: Zenkovsky, 1957, pp. 27-58 and Michels, 2000. For the phenomenon of Old Believers, see Cherniavsky, 1966, pp. 1-39. For the Old Believers’s theology and practices, see Button, 2015.
More promising in this regard could have been the emergence of the so-called Sabbatarians of Novgorod-Moscow Movement of the beginning of the 15th Century, at least for no other reason that they had a support from the first crowned tsar, Dimitry and counted among themselves many members of nobility and clergy. They also had the theologians, most prominent of whom was Fyodor Kurizin, a well-traveled diplomat as well, who spent 3 years at the court of King of Transylvania Matthias Corvinus, at a crucial time when the “proto-Reformation” of Hussites and Taborites in Bohemia fought against the power of the Church. Subsequently Kurizin became the first counselor to the tsar. The movement had a crossover potential, for not only the representatives and the tsar family were involved, but its ideas percolated to middle-classes in, for example, Pskov, and the villages as well. The mesure of its growing influence was the concern expressed by Gennady Gonozov, the founder of the Russian Inquisition, who wrote in a letter to Bishop Prohor that “the temptation, here, spread not only in the cities, but also in the villages.”

By the end of the 15th century, it seemed that this original version of proto-Reformation can spread its wings over the whole Russia, unopposed, but due to complex court intrigues, massive treacheries, bribes, internal conspiracies and slander, the movement was smoldered. On December 27, 1504 Kurizin and other followers were burned in wooden cages, having been accused beforehand by the Church council, the tsar and all the bishops of Judaizing tendencies. Later in the winter, the followers that belonged to clergy were consigned to the same fate as heretics. The movement was decimated, although for some time it still claimed allegiance of lower-classes that were invisible to the new court. With the Movement extinguished, the Russian proto-Reformation was stooped in its tracks. Soon thereafter, after the cruel reign of tsar Vasily (1505-1533), Ivan the Terrible ascended to the throne, where he stayed for the next generation, until 1584. No other experiment with the opening the religious sphere, on the scale of the Novgorod-Moscow Movement was even attempted.36 Now it is only a hardly remembered episode in Russian religious and political history. Nevertheless, it is an extremely interesting case to look at, even

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36 The story of this episode in Russian religious history is described in: Zhigankov, 2000.
from the standpoint of the so-called „alternative histories,” of what might have been, if this movement, originated well before Martin Luther and completely indigenous, (although influenced by its roots in cosmopolitan city of the time that was Novgorod), had won the internal court struggle and put Russia on the path of the Reformation. The other interesting question could be, how such a Reformation would look like, not having a cultural and political complexity of the Western-European Reformation(s) as contesting/emerging from/reacting to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. On the one hand, we can suspect that the form of the Russian incipient Reformation would be much simpler. As Kurizin was supposed to say: “The soul is autocratic. Faith is its protective barrier” (Zhigankov, 2000, p. 4). Zhigankov reads it, in a limiting sense that proves that “instead of completely relaying on human knowledge, the Russian reformers relied on God and the Scriptures as the final arbiter of their ideas” and differentiates their thinking from Renaissance humanism and rationalism. This is, of course, in the historical context, quite a legitimate interpretation, although it gives the Movement perhaps an a posteriori tint of fundamentalist tendencies. It can be countered by an argument, that if the representatives of the Movement wanted only to contemplate God apart from human knowledge they would have gone the well-traveled before path in the Orthodox Church, namely of separating themselves from the world. But they did not do it, they actively pursued their goals on the highest levels of the court – thus participating in the then existing knowlege/power axis at the points that they could access and exert their influence. And what is very interesting, on the basis of perusal of the literature of the day, Zhi-gankov himself puts as one if the tenets of their teaching, in addition to explicitly religious points, the recognition, absolutely revolutionary in their times (and in their place) that “true religion and science are not antagonistic to each other.” Of course, it is open to research and debate what they considered as science – whether it was a form of “advanced astrology,” as it was practiced at that time in Europe, or a science understood as philosophy, connected with their beliefs on the monism/dualism with relation to human nature and the immortality of the soul (to which position they were antagonistic). No matter the definition, though, the point is that they were not opposed to knowledge as supposedly agonistic towards God and the Scriptures.
This is on the credit ledger, when it comes to the possible win of the Novgorod Movement. Now, on the debit side, the question could be asked, how, even if the Movement had won in its natural habitat of Novgorod, could it have gone beyond localized persistence and attempt consolidation in the whole of Russia, with its huge territory, diversity of peoples inhabiting the large space? Would it have enough of the capacity and the prolonged power of agency to sustain the ability to use the levers of centralized power to its advantage? Could its individualistic spirit survive successfully the confrontation with mental structures of collectivism of Russian population-at-large?

In the context of modernity as such, the relevant question about this episode is whether historical events like the Novgorod Movement are only an outgrowth of a certain “historicity” and belong to the rubric of “archive,” or do they have enough of a potential to usher, in their time and place, but with the perspective of expansion, into a some sort of altermodernity. Nicolas Bourriaud explains this term as

a new modernity that would be based on translation. What matters today is to translate the cultural values of cultural groups and to connect them to the world network. This “reloading process” of modernism according to the 21st century issues could be called altermodernism, a movement connected to the creolisation of cultures and the fight for autonomy, but also the possibility of producing singularities in a more and more standardized world (Bourriaud, 2005).

Russia, in its all forms, especially the later ones, as enumerated by Ziernow: the Muscovy, the St. Petersburg’s empire and the Soviet power, while conducting the expansion on a vast scale, encountered the varieties of diverse cultures within the growing imperial holdings, its polymorphy, emerging migratory networks and cultural nomadism. The creation of the Russian empire was, in a sense a “pre-modern post-modern” kind of enterprise.

Its makers had to find proper means of discursive absorption of those territories, cultural practices, political institutions and life forms into a one whole. The bone in the throat of this long-term project were the autocratic formulas of government and state’s violence, as constant factors accompanying the expansion. No wonder, that the absence of freedom limited the possibilities of emerging an imperial
discourse that would be at once politically expansive but culturally embracing and respecting the multiplicity of values and experiences of the subjects of the empire. Due to its autocratic sources, Russian empire had never generated an open and generous project that would be inclusive in nature. The only idea that arose in the late phase of the empire was Euroasianism, a hyperculturalist blend of historiozophic, geographic and cosmological theories, a sort of a pastiche version of such a project. In its original version, as expressed by Lev Gumilev, this culturalist approach was tinted by a sense of tragedy of human existence, a sense of suffering and perceived non-significance of most of the populations in history. As a recognized expert on the tribes of inner Eurasia, Gumilev observed that what drove their march through history, was not the evolution toward the enlightenment and reason, but rather an endless cycle of migration, conquest and genocide. His approach was thus pessimistic as to the capabilities of human nature in terms of moving away from their basic instincts for survival. His world is essentially Hobbesian.

37 That it is not impossible in itself, show the examples of other empires, like France’s with its “liberty, egality, fraternity,” or the American credo of “We, the people,” or even the British empire’s acceptance of cultural diversity.

38 When we look at the aspect of a long duration of history, we can see that this Russian predicament is present still in our times. As writes Włodzimierz Marciniak: “Russia has stopped to promote any modernization projects in the post-Soviet countries, and the Russia’s mission in the post-Soviet space has been reduced exclusively to the notion of ‘stabilization’, while such values like ‘progress’, ‘development’, ‘modernization’, ‘democracy’ are associated only with Western states.” Marciniak, 2009, p. 143. (Translation from Polish mine).

39 In terms of sociology of knowledge, Euroasianism in its original form, associated with the names of Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Pyotr N. Savitzky and Lev Gumilev, and also in its derivative form of Neo-Eurasianism, represented most prominently by Alexander Dugin, can be treated as a reflection of the inability on the part of the Rusian elite of accepting the implosion of the empire. While in the case of the first wave, it can be said that Gumilev’s musings, for example, had some nobility that arose out of the tragedy of the “old Russia,” in the case of Neo-Euroasianism, it is a case of pastiche tout court.

40 Hobbes’ idea of exiting the state of nature is through means of social contract – a sort of a collective enterprise of folding into Leviathan. Gumilev’s correspondent term would be passionarnost. It is a capacious term, that can mean at the same time something akin to Machiavellian virtu, a martial spirit
Neo-Euroasianism, on its part, dispenses with the historiozophic pessimism of the “Fathers,” by “going metaphysical” and concentrating not on the tragedy of lives of the unrecognized masses, but on combating the perceived enemies. According to Dugin, the aim of Eurasianism as an idea was of a ‘closure’ of Russia to the West and an opening to the East in opposing the land of the continent to Europe. Such plans necessarily meant not only a strategic and geopolitical alliance, but also the opening of Russia to the metaphysical East with its ancient teachings of Hinduism, Shintoism, Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and this in turn meant translating Russian consciousness from one atheistic, utilitarian, narrowly rationalized, and long since spiritually stagnant in the context of European civilization into the lively and holistic world of the eastern tradition, i.e., a spiritualization of Russia with sacred energies.41

as well as a biological impulse that motivates people to irrational deeds. He recalls the example of Alexander the Great, who went on to conquer India and Central Asia, despite the fact, that he could not return the spoils from these countries to his Macedonia. Passionarnost was also revealed in the tribal solidarity of nomatic raiders on the cities, described by Ibn Khaldun as asabiyya. But Gumilev also perceived the idea of this term through the lens of capacity for suffering – especially that he came up with it during the 14 years that he spent in Siberia prison camps. Due to its obtuseness, the term can be, in fact, translated in many ways. On a most basic level, Konrad Świder translates it as „aktywność życiowa“ (life activity) – see Świder, 2015, p. 83. On the other hand, in his speech to the Russia’s Federal Assembly in December 2012, Vladimir Putin, gave his own definition of passionarnost: it is the “ability to move forward and to embrace change”. As he said.: “Who will come out ahead and who will remain outsiders and inevitably lose their independence will depend not only on economic potential, but primarily on the will of each nation, its internal energy; as said by Lev Gumilev, a passionarity, the ability to move forward and to change.” (Vladimir Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118). This is not, in fact, the first time that Putin brought the name of Gumilev in his discourse. In Kazan in 2005 he said: “Russia, developing as a multinational country, could organically integrate the richest heritage of the Volga land, or, as Lev Gumilev said, ‘the great steppe culture”. But this is the first time that he explicitly used the word “passionarnost”.

The neo-Euroasianist project is the Russian attempt at achieving altermodernity, as defined by Bourriaud. And looked upon, through these lens, it has to be assessed as deeply flawed. Putting aside its metaphysical dimension and the Westernophobia, it embraces the ancient religious teachings in such a way that it makes them immutable, as if nothing had changed in Hinduism, or Shintoism, Buddhism or Confucianism since their emergence on the world stage as full-fledged religions, as well as complex ways of coping with realities by large, but also diverse, populations. They are not perceived as living traditions, connected with the changes in various environments in which they exists, but as somehow portable entities that can be brought into an Euroasianist framework and be instrumentalized against “rationalized, utilitarian and spiritually stagnant, European civilization” as writes Dugin. In his ahistorical understanding, he does not appreciate the fact, that the Eastern religions that he thinks as “holistic” (in other words: pure, otherwordly, detached from earthly concerns, devoid of pragmatism and rational thinking) became, in the process of historical accomodation to modernity, as utilitarian, rational in their way, and spiritually diversified, as those that have their roots in the Western tradition. It is a very superficial reception of the Eastern religions, and as such, one of the glaring examples of a failed attempt at assimilating certain externalities, but without giving a due recognition to their “proper existence” and the space where they

42 A term “proper existence” (właściwe istnienie) was introduced by Jadwiga Staniszkis. She explains it as “ujmowanie całości nie w sposób realistyczny, jako wspólnoty ludzi, lecz w sposób bardziej złożony, jako węzła perspektyw myślowych, oraz prymatu tego nad iluzją perspektywy jednostkowej.” Staniszkis, 2016, http://publica.pl/teksty/Staniszkis-rozpoznawanie-nieoczywistosci-56270.html (Approaching the whole not in a realist way, as human community, but in a more complex way, as a node of the thought perspectives, and the primacy over the illusion of individual perspective). Contrast this with with the following view of Dugin: “If the Atlantic wave established after itself something sustainable in a cultural sense, something bright and eye-catching saturated with Western-centric arrogance and rationality, then the Turko-Sumerian heritage, although no less militant, was essentially modest, interior, easy, terse, and generally prone to cultural minimalism and the setting of being naked in the steps under the high and round sky of silent Eurasia”. (Dugin, see footnote 56). For him, everything is obvious and self-evident, when a human being finds himself naked under the sky of Eurasia. Staniszkis’s point about approaching the whole in the
could influence the new environment. What Euroasianism in fact does, is remaking the living religions and traditions of the East into a conveniently reconceptualized construct that could be submerged into the new, cosmic paradigm. On a psychoanalytic level, it can be said that Euroasianism replays the constant struggle in human history between exerting influence versus effecting submission. And when looked upon from this psychoanalytic perspective, it could be said that secularization is an extended process, across many imaginairums (including “civilizations”), as well as many human minds, of coming to terms with that struggle and its various recalibrations that would suit particular epochs. Without accepting the fact that modernity, and secularization, has left an indelible mark on the East as well as on the West, neo-Euroasianism can not become a credible project for altermodernity. It is no denying that Euroasianism, in both its forms, is prepared to embrace the notion of multiculturalism. In this, it forms a sort of a signpost for the governing elite. Vladimir Putin, very much “touched” by Euroasianist thought, often recalls the multicultural reality of the Russian Federation. In his speech in Kazan in 2005 he said:

Without exaggeration the principle of toleration, both national and religious, was central to the formation of Russian statehood. …Thanks to its multiethnic unity our country withstood many trials … the preservation of social, interethic, and inter-religious peace is the basic, fundamental condition of Russia’s successful development.43

And in his address to the Federal Assembly in December 2012 he expanded on this:

For centuries, Russia developed as a multi ethnic nation, a civilization-state, bonded by the Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture native for all of us, uniting us and preventing us from dissolving in this diverse world. We treat and will treat with great care and respect every ethnic group, every nation in the Russian Federation.

“realist” way of human community is very much in synch with Latour’s point about the “communities of saints.” They both agree that that approach has to be overcome.

43 Vladimir Putin, Speech on 26th of August, 2005 in Kazan, on the celebration of 1000 anniversary of the city.
Our diversity has always been and remains the source of our beauty and our strength.44

There is no better example of “multicultural ideology,” described by Bourriaud as something that “pretends to resolve the problem of modernism from a quantitative point of view: more and more ‘cultural specificities’ rear their heads, and, supposedly, this is positive. A new internationalist spirit has taken up the relay of the modernist universalism, but it lies in the internationalism of folklores and of ‘identities’” (Bourriaud, 2005).

Multicultural ideology, as spurned by Euroasianism and expoused by Russian governing elite, will never accept the “creolization” of the Russian culture. Its chief concern, as clearly stated by Putin, is “preventing us from dissolving in this diverse world.” Local folklores and identities of groups concentrated on remembrance of their traditions do not disturb the dominant Russian culture – they are a sort of an ornament. But it is only as long as they do not show their assertiveness, that at some point, may result in undesirable “creolization.” The Euroasianist project is not prepared for equipping the cultural groups within the Russian Federation in such a way that they values could be translated and connected to the world network. Instead of “re-loading of modernism,” as postulated by Bourriaud, the Euroasiatic project aims at dislodging modernity altogether. However sinister this goal is, there is little chance that it could be executed on a more than a localized area of sociopolitical imagination. It remains, despite some popularity in the governing circles, a blind alley of Russian thought.45

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45 When surveying and analysing the forms of Russian thought, we have to be alert to the fact, that Euroasianism is not the mainstream, default matrix of such thought, but a rather marginal one, especially as presented in the cosmic form by Alexander Dugin and his followers. Of course, the different issue is the infiltration of this ideology, in a half-baked version of the so-called geopolitics, in the political life within the Russian Federation. Here, Dugin himself is very active in the so-called expert circles around the Kremlin and the General Staff of the army. It is nevertheless very difficult to measure the extent of his real influence there. On Dugin and geopolitics in Russia, see Świder, 2015, especially Chapter III: Geopolityka w Rosji, pp. 69-115.
The inadequacy of the Euroasianist project as means of Russia’s coping with the reality of the globalized, creolized, and secularized world points to the “unfelicitousness” of Russia’s historical trajectory, with the absence of a full-blown Reformation. If the Novgorod Movement had had succeeded, if the environment for its survival and development had been more hospitable, perhaps Russia would have taken a totally different path to modernity, what would have allowed it to be now in a much better position to “reload modernity.”

Cultural formations, nevertheless, cannot relegate themselves outside of the framework of modernity (modernities) by the sheer willpower of their deep sub consciousness, as would be desired by Dugin and other thinkers with similarly cosmic ambitions.

If we accept the notion of a double helix, that holds, let us remind, that there is a possibility of a presence of a pair of congruent helices, that move along the same axis, but with differing translation, there arises thus a legitimate question: In what way the Russian culture made peace, or at least a truce with modernity? Where is the point of congruency?

As S.N. Eisenstadt noted, “the history of modernity is a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of multiplicity of cultural programs” (see footnote 23). The “program” means, as we noted previously, an expansive understanding of human endeavours in all their complexity and differentiations. Modernity (modernities) can consist of various types of programs: those that originate from the top of the social hierarchy of a given moment and are either imposed on the rest (like all kinds of totalitarian ideologies, for example Bolshevism), those that percolate in the niches, and – depending on the temporality of their emergence and their own ability to move on the knowledge/power axis – either have the ability to create larger movements or die out (Novgorod Movement), but also those that have enough tenacity within themselves and significant number of the high-quality and durable externalities supporting them that would allow them to crossover into vernacular culture.

46 These high-quality durable externalities can be very diverse. It can be a generalized “spirit of the time” that puts wind into particular cultural program. In case of Reformation(s) it was the turn toward individual experience of relations with God, in case of Enlightenment, the desire for experimentation in research of nature. It can also be a favourable political situation – in case of
Reformation in Russia, seen as a multidimensional historical project combining parallel differentiations in the political, religious and cultural spheres, that would have lead to a wholesale change in the form of secularization of the “proper existence” of social and political realms, never had a chance to have been enacted in the same way as it happened in the West. It would be a mistake, though, to assume that it never generated a “program” or “programs” of secularization, in a sense given to this term by Esenstadt. The difficulty that we may have in pinpointing them on a vast scale of Russian history stems from the fact that those programs, due to their strong temporality, can only be excavated by reaching to deep sources that were behind impulses of discontinuation, so much present in the Russian forms of thought. But the existence of those discontinuations cannot blind us to the fact, that Russia is a congruent helice in the double helix of modernity, and not an unspecified Other – “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” as said Winston Churchill (Churchill, 1939) and repeated many observers after him.

Secularization in Russia has formed, over centuries, a heterogenous text, resistant to a semantic unity and a certain totality (or completeness), that can be found, for example in the so called Petersburg Text – a term introduced by Vladimir N. Toporov and developed within the circle of the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ “What is meant by the PT is a collection of works in Russian literature which are incorporated under the concept of the PT through their semantic unity – a certain idea of St. Petersburg which they all share. The PT is thus a construct, a synthetic and synchronic “super-text,” written by various authors at different times in history. The notion is based on a semiotic concept of a “text,” conceived of as basic unit of culture. So construed, the concept of “text” is applicable to any cultural phenomenon capable of carrying an integral meaning. Thus, it does not refer only to written texts, i.e. to messages in natural language, but to a multiplicity of “texts” in various cultural languages. As such, it can be applied to a ceremony, behaviour, a work of art,
Temporality has usually intervened in Russian history, operating in the epistemological “wetland,” where nothing seems solid, and things, concept, ideas and institutions not so much endure in history as linger on until their semiotic value in culture finally plays-out. Only to be replaced by the one more respective of the new times.

This epistemological “wetland” is of course, a constitutive model of modernity since it put away with the Latour’s “communities of saints.” What is distinctive about the Russian situation, though, is that certain developments – like, for example, the emergence of the city of St. Petersburg, while originate as a result of a conscious move toward secularization of a public space, subsequently undergo the process of restitution back toward the religious impulse. Secularization in Russia thus may look more like a series of convulsive moves than a real thought-out program. But then, again, we cannot lose from our view the point made early about the loss of a sense of equilibrium that comes with modernity. Particular versions of modernities evidenced various levels of sensitivity to this development – Russia is probably the most sensitive in this regard. The proposed “programs” thus can have something of a rather diffident quality. The

among others, since all these possess an integral meaning and function in a cultural system, a meaning which can be defined” (Kononen, 2003, p. 17).

48 “Public space” meant not only in architectural sense, but also in a discursive sense. In Russian context it can refer both to opening space for transformation of Peter the Great’s country in a different type of society (aspect of cultural imitation of the West) as well as to a more panoptical aspect of introducing more effective system of order and control in order to create a surveillance state. For architectural aspect of Petrine reign in a broad context, see Hughes, 2004, pp. 334-352. For the order and control aspect, see Wortman, 2006. For the meaning of St. Petersburg, see. Buckler, 2004.

49 This reconstitution, or even the reversion of the St. Petersburg original myth, is present in Pushkin and Gogol, but nowhere did it find the stronger expression than in the whole ouvre of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, the central theme of which was “the road to purification through the experience of evil”, according to Kononen, op. cit., p. 20. She considers it the essence of the St. Petersburg myth –and as such, present in the corpus of texts that belong to the Petersburg Text. Nevertheless, it should be rather looked upon as a literary reconfiguration, and ideological inversion of the myth of origin of the city – if, in accordance with the Toporov’s and Tartu-Moscow school’s guidelines, we will treat St. Petersburg as a unified text – of which Peter the Great is an unavoidable part.
Enlightenment, which in the West was a strong political and cultural project, with hard edge of absolutism and scientific mentality, in Russia was trying to fold within itself the impulses of the Reformation that never was, and the “new thinking” that never would have actually transformed into the Enlightenment as experienced by the West. It was a hybrid epoch, and as such, 18th Century holds the position of “peculiar duality in the Russian cultural imagination” (Golburt, 2014). It was both “supremely significant and no longer capable of signifying” (Golburt, 2014). As such, it was one of the many examples of abrupt discontinuities in Russian history.

It is a “first epoch,” as says Golburt, in a sense, that as a closed chapter in history, it can become a fodder for “historicizing” it within different traditions and epochs.

In the eyes of thinkers such as Ivan Kireevsky, for example, the

> Principles of the Russian Enlightenment are completely different from those on which the enlightenment of the European nations was formed. (...) Although during the first centuries of its historical life Russia was no less educated than the West, yet as a consequence of foreign and apparently fortuitous obstacles, it was constantly stopped on the path of its enlightenment. Thus, it was able to preserve for the present day not a complete and finished expression of that enlightenment, but only some allusions, shall we say, to its true meaning, only its first principles and their mark on the mind and life of Russian man (Kireevsky, 1852).

Despite his wholehearted support for the Russian version of the Enlightenment as superior to the Western one, he nevertheless is perceptive enough to see that what is actually recoverable from it, are only “allusions,” “principles” and a “mark on the mind,” but not “a complete and finished expression” of that epoch.

The Enlightenment has thus, a residual, shadowy persistence on culture deep structure, but it can only function as a “historicized” artefact of the past, a “catalyst for reflections on contemporaneity,” as Golburt points out.

Due to the diffidency of a Russian version of modernity as a well-thought-out program, secularization, out of necessity, had to become an even more of a negotiated process than in the West.

In the West it was actually Reformation(s) that was the modernity’s First Epoch, in Golburt’s understanding of the sense of the “new
“time” as a series of “exceptional moments that can (...) be replicated (and) unprecedented climaxes and a uniform straight line that resist historical ebb and flow” (Golburt, 2014, p. 45). The Enlightenment was a period of consolidation that fortified some impulses already present in the Reformation(s). In Russia, due to the fact that the Reformation never had a chance to become a society’s default program, the resistance to the historical fluctuations of fortune – “felicitousness” or “unfelicitousness” of a given temporality, was much weaker.

The secularization was thus occurring in fits and starts, with new actors in each epoch entering the scene and then departing it, sometimes with a dramatic flair, sometimes in silence. But each time the paths had to be rediscovered, the traces of the previous programs uncovered again from under the rubble, by subsequent generations. This lack of underlying “inter-epochal” coherence and the impossibility of recalling Enlightenment – the only “modern” period in Russian history – as a prefiguration of the future, had formed a troubling aspect of Russian culture, in the eyes of many native thinkers, for example V. Belinsky. But it also caused some simplifications on the part of the Western researchers. Lesley Chamberlain argues, for example, that “essentially Russian-style philosophy is a counter-enlightenment mindset which takes Pascal as its founding father and rejects the West’s choice of Descartes. The ethical-religious attitude to knowledge leaves Russia without a rational tradition to uphold standards of objectivity and impartiality” (Chamberlain, 2005).

This discomfort with the fluidity of Russian culture was what had caused the so-called Hegelian turn in Russian philosophy. According to Vadim Shkolnikov reading Hegel was an extremely formative experience for Belinsky and a handful of his contemporaries, and Hegel’s historical dialectics became a way of interpreting not only one’s own development, but also that of the state, culture, and society in general. An important character in Belinsky’s personal Pantheon is found in Pushkin, and Shkolnikov argues that Pushkin was for Belinsky what the Absolute was for Hegel. See: Shkolnikov, 2013. On Belinsky’s philosophy see: Shkolnikov, (2003), pp. 63-72.

She also asserts that “All Russian philosophy except positivism was theology at heart”, which is no so much an overstatement, but a misnomer, in light of the investigation of the problem of secularization in Russia. For Chamberlain, as for quite a number of others, secularization is not an issue on the horizon, when it comes to Russia, which is perceived as a perennially religious country, confronted from time to time with anti-religious rulers (Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin, etc.). What is missing in this research is approaching the issue
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It ignores the fact, that, with all its ambiguities notwithstanding, Russian modernity, in its various guises: Piterian, Hegelian, Bolshevik, Khrushchevian, Perestroikian, etc., has had always attempted exactly to chase the phantom of Objective Reality, and Objective Truth. The strange way of adapting the external influences, as with the case of Hegelianism, including the fact that Belinsky looked at Pushkin as a substitute of Hegel’s Absolute, is but a one historical oddity that proves Russian culture’s incessant effort at gaming modernity.

Though, the Lacanian “Real” that the culture has tried to fudge in all the attempts in that regard, was the fact of autocracy as a default form of government in Russia. In this inhospitable environment the supposed “objectivity” was the only lamp post that the Russian culture could attach itself to without directly confronting the “Real” in all its despicability and its terror.

It is no accident, as they say, that scientific rationality has played such an important role in Russian imaginarius. The hidden, and unacknowledged master here is Jacques Lacan. The driving force, the impellent for seeking rationality is the “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1978). The lineage of this desire can be traced to Peter the Great and the founding of St. Petersburg, all the way through to the period of the Thaw in the 60’s. It was always the unfolding of a desire for what in Russian culture had constituted the Other, namely modernity without the interference of the autocracy, a gnawing form of the Real.

The Real and the Desired were, though, on a pre-programmed collision course. It had of course its turns and twists. Those twists could have been seen in the periodic “thaws,” when it looked like the autocracy was willing to limit it reach. And some hoped that the desire for modernity can be transformed into reality itself; with all the rationality, predictability and development. That was the hope of the last “Thaw” generation, under Khrushchev, and it was reflected of secularization not as a religion-non-religion contest but as dilemmas of achieving vs. non-achieving Sommerville’s differentiation.  

52 First edition, in French, appeared in 1973. One of the elements here is that “Desire is ‘the desire for something else’ since it is impossible to desire what one already has, the object of desire is continually deferred.” It can even be said that in order to keep on, the subject must defer the desire, since it is inattainable anyway.
in the whole genre of science-fiction literature, written by actual practitioners of science, like Danil Granin, who was an engineer by training, or Boris Strugatsky, an astronomer. But the thing about the “Thaw,” however, was, that despite of all the outward commitment to the openness of the process of relatively free inquiry for selected groups of technocratic apparatus and intelligentsia, whenever there was a threat to the system’s power, the regime was ready to quickly freeze up again. The “Thaw” could thus be rather thought of as a “volatile alternation of thaws and freezes, one succeeding the other at a dizzying pace” (Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., 2004, p. 340).

Most of the “thawers” from among the literary circles could not keep up with that pace. The result was that most engaged of them, like Granin and Strugatsky veered off toward the poetic and spiritual searches. When Strugatsky novel, Roadside Picnic (1972) was turned by Andrei Tarkovsky into the movie Stalker in 1979, “one of the models of narrative was transformed, by intuited degrees, into a spiritual parable with no trace of science-fictionality” (Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., 2004, p. 344). Danił Granin, on the other hand, in his lecture at the meeting of the Writers Union’s in 1978 spoke about “the deficit of romanticism and poetization of life.” In response, he published soon thereafter, in 1979, a novel “Kartina” (The Picture) that may serve as an example of writing in which the notion of “object-soul (…) comes to denote a (…) conception of the spirit of beauty (weighted on) by derivative ideas from Belinsky, German Idealism and Dostoyevsky (Maryniak, 1995, p. 85).

Thus, the Objective Reality and Objective Truth is reduced to a particular “object-soul,” further diminished epistemologically as a “spirit” of undefined, intuittive category of “beauty.” Although aestetically such a vision may be captivating on a literary plane, in psychoanalytical terms, however, this epistemological resignation can only be understood as a reversion toward infantile stage.

What the example of the “Thaw” shows, is that the “Real” of autocracy, even under the most fortuitous conditions, can assert itself with a vengeance. On the political plane it can involve various degrees of repression, in the intellectual sphere it causes a retreat from the influencing the public sphere to exercising private spiritual searches.
This failure of the “Thaw” in breaking the circle of the Real and the Desired, mirrors perfectly the deficiency of secularization, as experienced in Russia, through centuries of its history. It could have never come about as a full-fledged program. It had to be constantly negotiated and renegotiated in-between succeeding alternations in the status of concurrent temporalities, with their concommitant dispositifs. This protracted process is what gives the secularization its “proper existence,” to use Jadwiga Staniszkis’ term. What is important here is to always keep in mind that, whether in the West or in the East (in its various incarnations) this process takes place in the form of a double helix in which helices proceed in multidimensional space but along the same axis, differing by translation along the axis. While not being identical, helices build relationships along the way and feed off each other in an unending learning process. This interweaving makes the category of the “Other” obsolete, for it diverts attention of those who practice power from the real issue of modernity (ties), which is that of effective governmentality.

53 The term introduced by Michel Foucault. It indicates the various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures, which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body. The original French term dispositif is rendered variously as “dispositive,” “apparatus” and “deployment” in English translations of Foucault’s work. He understands them in a very broad sense: “What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogenous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. (Foucault, 1980, pp. 194-228). The dispositifs, in this broad understanding, would include, for example, St. Petersburg as an architectural form, but also Toporov’s Petersburg Text as a discursive apparatus. Foucault’s dispositif is in a productive relation here with Latour’s network.

54 According to Foucault, governmentality refers to the way in which the state exercises control over, or governs, the body of its populace. Governmentality connotes also the ways by which people are taught to govern themselves, shifting power from a center authority, like a state or institution, and dispersing it among a population. Governmentality chief problematics concerns the issue of how conduct is shaped, making “the art of governing” an embodied experience.
CONCLUSION

Taking a cue from Polanyi’s “personal knowledge,” our research has aimed at depicting a new cognitive perspective that seriously takes into consideration the interdisciplinarity of knowledge.

Research on secularization and research on Russia tend to form two different spheres of scholarly activities, often weighted down by stereotypes. The stereotype about secularization is that it refers mainly to decreasing the religious aspect of social life, which development is associated with the emergence of modernity. As for Russia, the stereotype is that it does not participate in modernity at all. Those stereotypes form an important obstacle on the way to understanding the modern world, in its diverse, often quite baffling appearances.

In our work, we wanted to go beyond the bafflement and propose a more productive way of relating Russia and secularization as a process of translating dispositifs of modernity in a contextual manner, that takes into consideration political dispositions, cultural traits, institutional practices and discontinuities of social development. In our view, only such a complex approach can give its due to the complexity of history and human affairs.


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