Sumienie i rozum praktyczny u Immanuela Kanta

  • Friedrich Ricken Friedrich J. Ricken SJ, doktor filozofii i teologii, emerytowany profesor historii filozofii i etyki w Hochschule für Philosophie w Monachium. Studia z filologii klasycznej, filozofii i teologii. Wykładowca w Hochschule für Philosophie w Monachium, w Hochschule für Philosophie und Theologie St. Georgen we Frankfurcie nad Menem oraz na uniwersytetach w Innsbrucku, Salzburgu, St. Louis MO oraz Georgetown (Washington DC). Najważniejsze publikacje książkowe: Der Lustbegriff in der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles (1976), Allgemeine Ethik (1983/ 42003); Philosophie der Antike (1988/ 32000); Antike Skeptiker (1994); Religionsphilosophie (2003); Gemeinschaft Tugend Glück (2004).
Słowa kluczowe: SUMIENIE (KANT)

Abstrakt

Conscience is a court of second instance. It is practical mind
insofar as practical mind confronts us with the duty to judge our
actions and insofar as practical mind examines whether we have
fulfilled this second order duty. Conscience allows an action only
if practical mind is certain that the action is not wrong, and it
examines whether this claim has been fulfilled. Practical mind
judges the action; conscience convicts and sentences, or acquits.
Practical mind is not able to decide the quaestio facti whether
I am responsible for the action; that is the task of conscience.
The sanctions of conscience are moral feelings; it is only through
moral feelings that we become aware of the necessity to judge
our actions through practical mind.

Opublikowane
2017-03-02
Jak cytować
Ricken, F. (2017). Sumienie i rozum praktyczny u Immanuela Kanta. Horyzonty Wychowania, 4(8), 55-67. Pobrano z https://horyzontywychowania.ignatianum.edu.pl/HW/article/view/1165