Foreign Policy Analysis in the Time of European Political Integration. Structural Realism and Europeanization – An Attempted Synthesis?

Summary

The subject of this article is a critical reflection on how to analyse contemporary foreign policy. In times of ever-faster globalisation and deepening European integration two questions appear to be particularly important: to what extent are the classic(al) methods of explaining and analysing foreign policy still relevant? Are new theoretical concepts needed that are functional and useful?

To accomplish the task described above, structural realism, as one of the major theories of international relations, has been juxtaposed with the very popular concept of Europeanization. Following this path, the relevant literature, consisting predominantly of Kenneth Waltz’s works published after the end of the Cold War and the creation of the EU, has been reviewed and analysed. As for Europeanization, materials devoted to the specific issue of its impact on the foreign policies of European states and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy as a whole has been used. To summarise, the attempt to combine and synthesize structural realism and the concept of Europeanization has been undertaken in search for an optimal (in a cognitive and explanatory aspect) method of analysing the foreign policies of EU Member States.
KEYWORDS
foreign policy, European Union, Europeanization, structural realism

ANALIZA POLITYKI ZAGRANICZNEJ W DOBIE INTEGRACJI EUROPEJSKIEJ. REALIZM STRUKTURALNY I EUROPEIZACJA – PRÓBA SYNTEZY?

Streszczenie

Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest krytyczna refleksja nad tym, jak badać współczesną politykę zagraniczną. W dobie nasilających się procesów globalizacyjnych oraz pogłębiającej się integracji europejskiej szczególnie mocno wybrzmiewa pytanie, na ile adekwatne i skuteczne pozostają klasyczne metody wyjaśnienia i analizy, a na ile nowe propozycje/koncepcje teoretyczne są potrzebne, funkcjonalne i wartościowe.

Aby zrealizować tak nakreślone zadanie, zostawiono realizm strukturalny jako jedną z teorii stosunków międzynarodowych z bardzo popularnym w studiach europejskich konceptem europeizacji. W tym celu dokonany został przegląd i analiza literatury źródłowej; w przeważającej części były to teksty Kennetha Waltza, opublikowane już po zakończeniu zimnej wojny oraz wkraczeniu integracji europejskiej w nowy etap po powstaniu Unii Europejskiej (UE). W kontekście europeizacji autorka sięgnęła przede wszystkim do tekstów omawiających szczególne przypadek europeizacji polityki zagranicznej oraz europejskiej polityki zagranicznej. W podsumowaniu podjęto próbę syntetycznego połączenia realizmu strukturalnego z konceptem europeizacji. Celem takiego działania jest poszukiwanie optymalnego (w sensie poznawczym i eksplanacyjnym) sposobu analizowania polityki zagranicznej państwa w warunkach jego członkostwa w UE.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
polityka zagraniczna, Unia Europejska, europeizacja, realizm strukturalny

INTRODUCTION

The emergence and development of the European Union (EU) has unquestionably influenced processes occurring in the international environment. As the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
has gradually become institutionalised through “the development of [its own] tools and procedures,” it has become more than just the sum of national foreign policies of the Member States (MS) [Beach 2012, p. 209]. At the same time, the phenomenon of European integration has had a substantial impact on how nation-states gathered in the EU behave in the international environment. In other words, EU membership has spurred certain changes in their foreign policies.

It seems, however, that despite the numerous and profound changes that we have witnessed over the past decade or so (technological progress, economic and social globalisation), the actual definition of foreign policy has not been altered in any significant way. It is still understood as a sphere and form of the activity of states (and, secondarily, other actors of international relations). It is purposeful, and its content is dictated by raison d’état [Zięba 2007, p. 37-58]. In terms of form, foreign policy is perceived as a sum of all activities undertaken by a state in the international environment [for more on the subject see: Łoś-Nowak 2011, p. 17-20 or Beach 2012, p. 1-3]. In other words, foreign policy can be identified as “a strategy or approach chosen by a national government to achieve its goals in relations to external entities” [Bindi, Shapiro 2010, p. 340].

One should remember that foreign policy is dynamic and reacts to changes within the system. What changes most frequently is the choice of its instruments, while national interests remain fairly constant. However, in times of European integration, governments of particular Member States may change their perception of the foreign policy itself, its scope and operational priorities. This is why the major goal of this paper is to conceptualise an optimal way of analysing a given EU Member State’s foreign policy.

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1 The current doctrine of international law holds that a state as the sole primary subject of international politics and the only entity that possesses the attribute of sovereignty. The “other actors” mentioned here are, for example, international organisations. Their subjectivity (if it can be discerned at all) is, however, of secondary character and depends on the will of states which form it (and in case of NGOs, on the will of the state in which it operates).
THE CLASSICAL APPROACH – ALREADY UNFASHIONABLE, BUT IS IT STILL USEFUL?

The choice of a paradigm: between realism and liberalism

In the research field of international relations, we can identify two basic analytical approaches, often called paradigms (table 1). The concept of paradigm is somewhat unclear. Typically, it is understood as a group of logically coherent theories and concepts that together form the basis of a given science. To put it in other terms – a paradigm provides us with a model for explaining and understanding the world [Kuhn 1970, p. 43-51]. However, paradigms in the social sciences are very different from those formulated in the natural sciences. In international relations, the lack of a universally adopted analytical model means two things. Firstly, it signifies the conditions in which the scientific discourse is led. Secondly, it forces scholars to begin their analyses by making a methodological choice. When analysing foreign policy, we choose, most of all, from two alternative approaches: the liberal and the realist.

Table 1. Explanatory paradigms in international relations

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<th>Liberal paradigm</th>
<th>Realist paradigm</th>
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<td>• the primary actors of international relations are <strong>individuals</strong>, who may give up a part of their freedom for the purpose of pursuing their interests; individuals are by nature rational and seek to pursue their interests in the conditions of peaceful and harmonious coexistence;</td>
<td>• the primary actors of international relations are <strong>states</strong>; realists perceive the state as a homogenous, integrated entity that interacts with its peers; • actions undertaken by states are driven by their <strong>national interests</strong>; a state can pursue its interests if it possesses sufficient power;</td>
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2 It should be noted that apart from the two approaches mentioned here (realism and liberalism), the attempts at theorising international politics have produced some more detailed concepts that might be considered as alternatives to both realism and liberalism (for example, constructivism).
- **state** does not represent some general, all-encompassing national or social interests, nor does it pursue an abstract *raison d’État*; instead, it reflects a certain configuration of interests and aspirations expressed by various social groups;
- far-reaching **democratisation** of a state guarantees that its actions will be coherent with the will of its citizens;
- **sovereignty** is therefore the function of society (a nation, understood as the whole of citizens), rather than the state; the state serves merely as a tool with which citizens can pursue their interests; this is connected to the liberal concept of subjectivity, and is also used in international politics;
- the crucial goal of any state is to ensure its own **security**, which in turn guarantees its sovereignty;
- the **sovereignty** of a state in international relations implies far-reaching decentralisation in the process of shaping the world order;
- chaos that may occur in the international environment may be remedied by achieving **balance of power** through a system of alliances;
- neorealism is a systemic theory in that it looks for the causes of events occurring in the international environment in the properties of the system;

Source: own compilation [based on: Dyduch 2012a, p. 167-169].

Although opinions on the efficiency and relevance of the two above-mentioned paradigms are divided, one may claim that (particularly during the Cold War) realism dominated the research on national foreign policies. Currently states remain major players of international relations, and they are the only entities that can conduct coordinated, long-term external policies. As Teresa Łoś-Nowak claims: “the international system is a system of states” [Łoś-Nowak 2011, p. 17]. Moreover, she considers foreign policy to be a function of the state – a territorial subject of international relations. As for non-territorial subjects present in the international system (e.g. international organisations or commercial corporations), they are entitled to conduct international (not foreign) policies, understood as any kind of interaction between themselves as well as between them and states [Łoś-Nowak 2011, p. 29]. When arguing in favour of the privileged position of the realist paradigm for foreign policy analysis, one can refer to an ongoing political debate on further European integration. It is not possible to ignore sceptical voices on the question
of how far this integration should go. Especially in times of financial crisis, one can observe the growing assertiveness of some MS, who have been strong and skilled enough to strengthen their positions. In summary, today only states are entitled to push for further European integration, to stop it or even to withdraw from the existing integrative structure. When talking about the EU, representatives of the Member States refer most of all their own states' interests. In analyzing the foreign policy of an EU MS one can become sceptical about explanatory power of the concepts and theories connected to the liberal paradigm. The works of Mitrany, (functionalism) Lindberg, Haas (neo-functionalism) or Deutsch (transactionalism) were basically focused on the realm of economic integration – where the integrations should begin to be successful [for more, see: Konopacki 1998a, Konopacki 1998b, Konopacki 1998c]. The critics of functionalism, such as S. Hoffman, have argued that "European integration should not be examined through a separate theory, but rather within the framework of international interdependencies" [Czup toothicz 2008, p. 127-128]. They have also accused neofunctionalists of "misunderstanding the human psychic," as well as "failing to specify in detail the conditions necessary and sufficient for the process of integration to occur." Finally, they pointed to their "failure to understand the primacy of politics and security over the economy" [Czup toothicz 2008, p. 127-128]. I find this conclusion to be a compelling reason for choosing realism as the theoretical framework for further considerations in this paper.

As Stephan Walt has admitted, "realism is not a single theory, and realist thought evolved considerably throughout the Cold War" [Walt 1998, p. 31]. A Realist theory of international relations has undergone substantial changes since Hans Morgenthau laid its six basic principles in his book entitled "Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace" [Morgenthau 2010, p. 19-30]. Partly, the changes have been spurred by the criticism that realists provoked with their ideas. To some extent, they have also resulted from the way proponents of realism reacted to the shift in the nature (meaning both the structure and the way of functioning) of the international environment. One of the particularly influential creators and proponents of realism is Kenneth Waltz. The brief presentation of structural realism (referred to as neorealism) is somewhat reductive, since I have based
it almost exclusively on Waltz’s ideas. Furthermore, I have chosen those pieces of his work that are related to the integration processes occurring in Europe – their course, causes and implications for both the international environment and intra-European order (or, strictly speaking, balance of power). Such succinctness in considering Waltz’s work on structural realism in deliberate. During his long and distinguished academic career Walt has advocated a fairly coherent vision of international relations and their analysis. Of course, if the subject of this article had been defined differently, I might have broadened my discussion on the realist paradigm in the context of foreign policy to encompass detailed theories and concepts that function within it. I might also have included theoretical proposals that stem from the debate between the proponents of realism and liberalism, such as Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism. However, as the scope of this paper is narrower, therefore such a broad analysis has to left for another article. Below, I present the key points of neorealism according to Kenneth Waltz.

Basic principles of Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism

The first, fundamental principle that should be stated here is that neorealists consider systems analysis as an appropriate tool for analysing international politics. According to Waltz, a key task of every researcher lies in defining and describing the structure of the international system. He also describes how the international structure emerges: it is formed as a consequence of interactions between states and “constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others” [Waltz 1990, p. 29]. The international structure is anarchic and consists of units. The term unit refers to, or is often identified as, a state. As Waltz states: “each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit” [Waltz 1990, p. 37, cited in: Ruggie 1986]. At the same time, it is said that states vary in terms of the power they wield, but are identical in terms of their functions. Power, in the words of the renowned scholar, “is simply the combined capabilities of a state” [Waltz 1990, p. 36]. Moreover, it is a category
that allows us to characterise the international structure. One issue
that neorealists find necessary to analyse is the distribution of power
between states and its possible changes.

It is worth mentioning that “interacting states can be adequately
studied only by distinguishing between structural and unit-level
causes and effects” [Waltz 1990, p. 33]. Waltz explains that “inter-
national politics can be understood only if the effects of structure
are added to traditional realism’s unit-level explanations” [Waltz
1990, p. 34]. For example, when analysing the foreign policies of EU
Member States, one needs to take account not only of their mutual
interactions, but also of the elements of the structure in which they
function. Under certain conditions that will be discussed later in this
paper, one may consider the CFSP to be just such a structure.

Waltz also proposes to “distinguish factors internal to the interna-
tional political system from those that are external,” which allows us
to “establish the autonomy of international politics and thus makes
a theory about it possible” [Waltz 1990, p. 29]. This differentiation in
Waltz’s concept results in the need to divide a state’s activity into two
spheres, namely the internal (which is organised hierarchically), and
the external (international). The latter one, as was stated above, is an-
archic. Anarchy is a constant rule that governs international politics –
its logic applies regardless of which element one adopts as a constitu-
ent part of a system: be it a tribe, state or company [Gałganek 2012,
p. 233]. The logic of anarchy dictates that “each state fend for itself
with or without the cooperation of others” [Waltz 1993, p. 59]. The
interactions between states (their leaders and allies) are driven by
particular interests that determine the position of each stakeholder.
Cooperation is possible, but not necessary – it is not the only option.
Waltz admits that the way units (states) behave within a system is
determined by their wealth and military power: “the more productive
and the more technologically advanced countries have more ways of
influencing international outcomes” [Waltz 1990, p. 60].

Similarly, neorealists believe that the dominant goal of states
is their own security, “since to pursue whatever other goals they
may have, they first must survive” [Waltz 1997, p. 915]. As was men-
tioned above, most states do not wield enough power to be able to
ensure their security singlehandedly — this is why they form alli-
ances, or sometimes look to be protected by more powerful states.
The resulting balance of power between units in the structure may provide them with conditional security. It is important to keep in mind that “states’ actions are not determined by structures”. Firstly, one should clarify and emphasize the meaning of the word determined. As Waltz admits: “structures encourage certain behaviours and penalize those who do not respond to the encouragement” [Waltz 1979, p. 106]. Structures merely “shape and shove” the states, but interactions between them are voluntary. In other words, to be determined means “to have to.” Because the structures might influence or condition, but not “determine,” their importance lies in the fact that they encourage states to do some things and to refrain from doing others. As states coexist in a self-help system, they are free to do any foolish thing they care to, but they are likely to be rewarded for behaviour that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behaviour that is not [Waltz 1979, p. 915].

Discussing the problem of governance in the globalisation era, Waltz makes an interesting point which should be considered as a continuation of the above statements. He claims that the level of a state’s (economic) dependence (for example, on imports) translates into its real power and therefore shapes its behaviour and role in the international structure. Hence, states that are relatively independent (in terms of economy and military power) may set the “terms of political, economic and military competition in the international-political system” [Waltz 1999, p. 698]. The less powerful units (states) are forced to toe the line.

Just as the concept of power in realist theory has evolved, so has the definition of security. Neorealists argue that as an analytical category used to describe and explain foreign policy, it should be considered multidimensional. It contains the military, economic, social, environmental and political aspects. The political one may be treated as something of an “umbrella category,” since, as Waltz puts it: “the more interdependent the system, the more surrogate for government is needed” [Waltz 1999, p. 699].
Explaining processes within the system: how structural realism interprets the European integration and explains its consequences

In his article entitled *The Emerging Structure of International Politics*, published in 1993 in the renowned academic journal “International Security,” Kenneth Waltz examined challenges that faced analysts of international relations in the period after the Cold War. He described and assessed the state of international politics in the conditions of a dynamically changing structure of the international system. He argued that as integration processes in Europe took on new forms and grew in intensity towards the end of the Cold War (in both economic and institutional aspects), they contributed to the reorganisation of the structure of international politics. However, looking at the problem from a different angle, he noticed that European integration was strictly related to the dissolution of the bipolar world order. In other words, he realised that integration processes in Europe would not have taken such direction if it had not been for the fall of the USSR and the shift in the USA’s role. As it turned out, then, regional economic integration came as a response to political changes within the system.

Taking note of the advanced economic integration in Western Europe, Waltz observed:

> many believe that the EC has moved so far towards unity that it cannot pull back, at least not very far. That is probably true, but it is also probably true that it has moved so far towards unity that it can go no further. The easier steps towards unity come earlier, the hardest one later, and the hardest of all at the end [Waltz 1993, p. 70].

As one may easily deduce, by easy steps he meant decisions made by European leaders in the area of economic integration. Those that required solidarity when it came to bearing the costs of integration (in addition to fair distribution of benefits) were more difficult. The hardest ones, in his opinion, were measures and decisions adopted by the Member States to shape the EU into a political entity able to conduct its own foreign policy. To grant the Union subjectivity in international politics, its members would have to give up a part of their sovereignty. Referring to this notion, Waltz wrote: “especially
in Britain and France, many believe that their states will never finally surrender their sovereignty” [Waltz 1993, p. 70]. Moreover, he assessed that “unity in Western Europe has become more difficult to achieve partly because there is no real threat to unite against” [Waltz 1993, p. 78]. A real threat, he argued, was not the prospect of the European economy losing its competitive edge. It had to be something rooted in politics that would cause a decline in national security, with security being dependent on a state’s ability to optimise its capabilities. As Waltz put it:

the most important events in the international politics are explained by differences in the capabilities of the states, not by economic forces operating across states or transcending them [Waltz 1999, p. 698].

Taking this thought further, he explained that

economic interest and market forces do not create blocs; governments do. Without governmental decision, the Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community and the European Union would not have emerged [Waltz 1999, p. 698].

Following the above considerations, Waltz believes that organisations, common institutions and other forms of integration reflect the political will of rational actors (states) who create them and operate within them in search for more efficient ways of achieving their goals. The American scholar claims that “international institutions are created by the more powerful states, and the institutions survive in their original form as long as they serve the major interests of their creators, or are thought to do so” [Waltz 2000, p. 26]. This position reflects the general principles of realism, according to which

international organisations are dominated by the most powerful member states (...) while the weaker countries wield far less influence over the rules and institutions created by a given organisation” [Grosse 2005, p. 71].

Waltz also observes that “most international law is obeyed most of the time, but stronger states bend or break laws when they choose to” [Waltz 2000, p. 27]. A careful observer of EU realities can easily point to numerous examples of just such a situation, for instance with
regard to regulations on fair competition, the Common Agricultural Policy or economic and monetary union.

On many occasions Waltz mentioned the role and importance of “powerful states” for the processes occurring in international politics. Having in mind that “confidence in economic ability and technical skill leads a country to aspire to a large political role,” he predicted that Germany would attempt to take the leadership in Europe [Waltz 2000, p. 61]. He believed that factors such as economy, military potential, population and geopolitical location predisposed this country to become the prime actor on the European scene. Time proved Waltz right, and today one has to admit that the “increased international activity of Germany reflects the changing structure of international politics” [Waltz 1993, p. 64]. Both Germany and Russia managed to “relearn their old great-power role” [Waltz 1993, p. 72].

It is worth emphasising that Germany benefited substantially from the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. First of all, unification became possible. Secondly, European aspirations of the newly democrtised countries of Eastern and Central Europe were convergent with German foreign policy goals. By enlarging the EU (particularly with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), Germany sought to develop its export-based economy. Moreover, since those countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 were more relevant to the foreign policy of Germany than that of France or Great Britain, it is believed that their accession further strengthened Germany’s position. Still, one can hardly omit the fact that after the fall of the USSR, most of its former allies turned to the United States as they looked for a new protector. As Grosse points out, “as a result, Germany worked to increase the power of the French-German duo in European politics, and to build closer cooperation between Paris, Berlin and Moscow” [Grosse 2005, p. 85]. By undertaking these actions, Germany attempted (successfully, as it turned out) to counteract the USA’s influence over Europe.

The question of why countries other than Germany, France and Great Britain legitimised integration (not only economic, but also political) remains open. Waltz wondered about “how can an alliance endure in the absence of a worthy opponent?” [Waltz 1993, p. 45]. His inquiry may provide us with a basis for dissecting a somewhat more complex problem: what motivations did Member States and
candidates for membership have for participating in the integration process after the end of the Cold War? What were the determinants of their behaviours? Why, after spending long decades fighting for full independence, did Poland or the Baltic states want to join the EU, if by doing so they would effectively make themselves second-rate players in terms of possibilities for articulating and pursuing their raison d'état? As Russia has been regaining its power since the outset of the new millennium, the former Soviet bloc countries felt threatened. They considered their accession to the EU as a measure that would ensure relative security. As Waltz put it in *Evaluating Theories*,

very weak states cannot make themselves secure by their own efforts. Whatever the risks, their main chance may be to jump on a bandwagon pulled by stronger states. Other states may have a choice between joining a stronger state and balancing against it, and they may make the wrong one [Waltz 1997, p. 915].

When one examines the debate over what determined the Eastern and Central European states' desire for integration, it is hard to reject the following notion presented by Waltz:

I see “balance of threat” not as a name of a new theory but as a part of a description of how makers of foreign policy think when making alliance decisions [Waltz 1997, p. 916].

Still, one should bear in mind that such a threat does not always refer directly to external or internal security. Sometimes leaders of those weaker states fear that by refusing to join a regional organisation (in our case, the EU), “they would lose any possibility of influencing its activities, and hence risk even greater marginalisation and weakening of their international position.” Grosse assesses that such mechanism can put weak countries in a situation of “soft dependence” on regional powers [Grosse 2005, p. 71].

The conclusions from Waltz’s deliberations on European integration, particularly in its political dimension, call for far-reaching scepticism as to the prospects for the further development of the EU foreign policy. The scholar claims that
Western Europe was unable to make its own foreign and military policy when it was an organization of six or nine states living in fear of the Soviet Union. With less pressure and more members, it has even less hope of doing so now – unless – Germany, becoming impatient, decides to lead a coalition [Waltz 2000, p. 31-32].

Following this line of thought, I shall now move on to the second part of the article by proposing a somewhat provocative hypothesis that the Europeanization of foreign policy means, in fact, its “Germanisation” – at least to a large extent.

EUROPEANIZATION – STILL FASHIONABLE, BUT WHAT IT IS AND IS IT REALLY USEFUL? DETERMINANTS OF THE DEBATE OVER EUROPEANIZATION

The debate over how and to what extent Europeanization affects national foreign policies entered a new stage as the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009. There were several reasons for this development. First of all, the Treaty abolished the EU’s pillar structure, and so removed the formal division between political and economic integration. Secondly, it disrupted the purely intergovernmental character of EU institutions responsible for conducting the common foreign policy, by complementing them with supranational bodies/posts (such as the posts of the President of the European Council and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). Thirdly, it changed the rules of decision-making by abolishing, in certain cases, the need for unanimity. Finally, it established the Union as a legal entity, hence providing it with wider capabilities with regard to operationalising the activities of its supranational institutions. All these changes affected not only the EU itself but also its MS, influencing their role, position and activities in the field of foreign policy [for more, see: Dyduch 2012a]. Indeed, rather than invalidating Wong’s claim that “foreign and security policy is one of the last remaining bastions of national sovereignty” [Wong 2007, p. 334], they spurred further discussion on the nature of national foreign policies and their susceptibility to Europeanization.
Before the Lisbon Treaty, one thing was certain with regard to foreign policy: all Member States maintained the attribute of sovereignty, since they enjoyed equal status in the EU Council of Ministers and the European Council. Moreover, they had the power of veto which allowed them to freeze the decision-making process in the field of foreign relations. With the Lisbon Treaty in force, this has changed, although it is still hard to determine to what extent the new regulations are reflected in practice. This is so for two reasons: (1) Declarations no 13 and 14, annexed to the Treaty, confirm the Member States’ right to conduct their own foreign policies; (2) since the Treaty came into force, there has been no situation in international politics when the MS would find themselves in serious disagreement (as was the case with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003).

What, then, can we say about the contemporary foreign policy of EU Member States and about the MS themselves as subjects of international politics, both at the national and European levels? Is Ladrech’s statement that “MS continue to control their foreign policy in such way that EU institutions remain marginal to their formal development and operations” [Ladrech 2010, p. 190] still valid? Considering the uneven potentials of European countries, one has to acknowledge that their capabilities for pursuing national interests and influencing other actors of the system are widely varied. The differences may refer to aspects such as “size of MS and the extent of a state’s foreign relations networks, as well as historically conditioned variables, such as national identity and strategic culture” [Alecu de Flers, Müller 2012, p. 23]. Economic potential and its contribution to the EU budget constitute another vital element that defines a state’s position within the Union. The 28 MS also differ in the extent of familiarity with and understanding of the mechanisms governing EU common policies. The so-called “old MS” have had much more time for “European socialisation,” including the shaping of policy for staffing EU institutions. The Union, as it exists today, is to a large extent their creation. For the “new MS” (those which acceded in 2004 and 2007), European integration was just about the only viable option, and it came down largely to incorporating EU regulations into their national legal systems without any serious debate. These countries lacked sufficient numbers of staff who were qualified and experienced enough to properly “manage” their membership. Upon the completion of a tedious
accession process, what often occurred was that the ruling elites had no clear idea of how to use their country’s membership status to articulate national interests. Besides, in several cases full membership appeared to be as far as the consensus between major political forces reached. While achieving it was “everybody’s goal,” the ideas about what exactly to do with it tended to be widely divergent.

In search for the meaning of Europeanization

The progressing integration in Europe, which brought about deeply institutionalised cooperation and the transfer of competences from the national to the EU level, is perceived as unprecedented in the history of international politics. As such, in the opinion of numerous scholars, it requires new analytical models that would facilitate and professionalise research. Integration in various areas (economic, political, cultural) has not proceeded at the same pace, although there is no doubt that the results of cooperation in one of these areas has influenced, or even determined, the progress of cooperation in others. All types of undertakings (be it with regard to law-making or political activity), both at the national and European levels, had certain consequences for the shape of the entire system. If for the purpose of these deliberations we consider the EU synonymous to the European system, we have to consider its Member States and, to some extent, supranational institutions (such as the European Commission) as its components. One inherent feature of the European system is its malleability. The changes to the system’s structure are necessarily written into the cause-and-effect logic of its interactions with the environment. Therefore, researchers of European integration have been interested both in the EU’s internal development and in its foreign relations. In the latter aspect, the European system is, in fact, a subsystem of the international system.

3 According to Easton, the concept of a “European system” involves an assumption about the existence of a certain structure, which contains elements linked together through numerous and dynamic interactions. These interactions may result in interdependence between particular elements. Additionally, systems analysis requires us to pay attention to relations between the system and its environment.
The above-mentioned trends in the research on European integration have been reflected in J. Olsen's pioneering paper on the conceptualisation of European research, entitled "The Many Faces of Europeanization." Olsen pointed out five plausible definitions of Europeanization. Each of them treats this phenomenon as a process, and each provides a basis for defining the scope of this research field. When summed up (which, according to Olsen, is far from easy), these definitions reflect, in a fairly comprehensive manner, the complex and multi-dimensional nature of Europeanization. According to Olsen, Europeanization can be perceived as a process of:

1. **Changes in External Territorial Boundaries.** This involves the territorial reach of a system of governance and the degree to which Europe as a continent becomes a single political space. For example, Europeanization is taking place as the European Union expands its boundaries through enlargement.

2. **The Development of the Institutions of Governance at the European Level.** This signifies centre-building with a collective action capacity, providing some degree of political coordination and coherence. Formal-legal institutions and a normative order based on some overarching constitutive principles, structures and practices both facilitate and constrain the ability to make and enforce binding decisions and to sanction non-compliance.

3. **Penetration of National and Sub-National Systems of Governance.** Europeanization here involves the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of governance. All multilevel systems of governance need to work out a balance between unity and diversity, central coordination and local autonomy. Europeanization, then, implies adapting national and sub-national systems of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms.

4. **Exporting Forms of Political Organization and Governance that are Typical and Distinct for Europe Beyond the European Territory.** Europeanization here concerns relations with non-European actors and institutions and how Europe finds a place in a larger world order. Europeanization, then, signifies a more positive export/import balance as non-European countries import more
from Europe than vice versa, and European solutions exert more influence in international fora.

5. a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe. The degree to which Europe is becoming a more important political entity is related both to territorial space, centre-building, domestic adaptation, and how European developments impact and are impacted by systems of governance and events outside the European continent [Olsen 2002, p. 923-924].

When one examines the academic discourse on the concept, one easily notices that it has been used most of all to indicate changes the EU MS have undergone due to their participation in European integration. Olsen’s definitions are broader – they explain that the process results in changes not only within the EU, but also in its surrounding areas [compare: Wach 2013, p. 17-22]. What is missing from Olsen’s proposal is a clear indication of who is the subject of these changes – in other words, who initiates and benefits from Europeanization. Such a clarification is fundamental for the analysis of foreign policy. Most scholars who have written on this topic seem to assert that the subjects in question are states, but they do it almost in passing, as if it was obvious. EU supranational institutions, engaged in co-ordinating political co-operation within the EU, are also frequently indicated to be the subjects of this process. However, their subjectivity (both in their legal and international-political aspects) is secondary in character, derived from that of nation-states. In the case of foreign policy analysis, such imprecision may result in a confusion that blunts our ability to explain the whole process and produce meaningful conclusions.

To conclude the above considerations, it can be said that for the purpose of this paper, Europeanization is understood as a multidimensional process/phenomenon. It involves

construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which can be first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies [Radaelli 2004, p. 3].
At the same time, it is about the influence of the MS (individual states as well as group of states) on the process of creating common EU rules, norms, politics and policies. Both phenomena take place simultaneously and permanently. They influence one another by creating a structure of the European system, which is a part of the international system. Europeanization occurs in every realm of European integration (economic, social as well as political). In the field of foreign policy, it has a strongly voluntary nature. The emphasis here has to be placed on the actors who make and change foreign policy [Moumoutzis 2011, p. 625]. At this point, the only actors capable of doing this are nation-states.

Foreign policy is often perceived as a specific area of Europeanization, with its own logic. The (still) strongly intergovernmental character of political cooperation gives it a “non-hierarchical” basis [Alecu de Flers, Müller 2012, p. 21].

**Europeanization of foreign policy – research advantages**

As Janusz Ruszkowski stated in his book, “Europeanization is not a theory – rather, it is a phenomenon worthy of explaining” [Ruszkowski 2010, p. 358]. Indeed, the view that Europeanization is not an independent theory of European integration is fairly common. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse concurs, stating that Europeanization “applies most of all to procedural and organisational issues, which locates it among concepts focused on management in the EU” [Grosse 2012b, p. 20]. It is must be clarified here that my goal is far from even attempting to create a Europeanization theory. Rather, I aim to consider the question of whether, and if so, how, the already existing debate on theorizing Europeanization can be utilized for foreign policy analysis. The authors of a great majority of academic works devoted to Europeanization have stressed that it is a multi-dimensional process. Below, I indicate three dimensions that should be taken into account when analysing the foreign policies of EU Member States.
DIMENSIONS

When reviewing the literature on Europeanization [Ladrech 2010; Featherstone, Radaelli 2003; Mounountzis 2011], one quickly notices that most scholars distinguish at least two dimensions of this process. The first one is referred to as bottom up (also sometimes calleduploading), while the second one is termed top-down (or downloading). Nonetheless, having in mind Olsen's work, I see the need to include here one more dimension, which some scholars term ad extra [Ruszkowski 2010, p. 367], while others call it “Europeanization beyond Europe” [Schimmelfennig 2009].

The character and specific nature of each dimension are explained in the table below (table 2.). It is my hope that the table will constitute a clear and easily understandable form for presenting the phenomenon of Europeanization. It should also help to capture and point out the interdependence between all dimensions, and consequently produce a single set of outcomes influencing foreign policy of actors in the system / structure.

Table 2. Dimensions of the foreign policy Europeanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>bottom up (uploading)</th>
<th>top-down (downloading)</th>
<th>’ad extra’ (beyond Europe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EU MSs seek to influence (co-create) EU foreign policy and foreign policies of other MS</td>
<td>• MSs are subject to influence and stimuli from the EU</td>
<td>• EU exports the European model of governance and management and tries to spread European values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Ruszkowski 2010, p. 367-384].

Two comments might be added here to complete the above-stated assumptions. Firstly, in the case of foreign policy, the division between the first two dimensions of Europeanization is not as obvious as in other areas (such as the Common Agricultural Policy or the single market). Conceptualisation of “downloading” Europeanization is particularly problematic, since it is not clear what exactly the EU stands for in this sense. As it seems, sometimes the EU is associated with the position of all its MS. In other cases, with the position of just
its three most powerful members: Germany, France and Great Britain. In still other cases, it is associated with the position of a regional coalition (such as, for example, the Visegrad countries), but only if none of the major powers are against it. To sum up, it can be said that “larger MS are (...) «shapers» rather than «takers»” [Alecu de Flers, Müller 2012, p. 23]. Moreover, the impact of the so-called EU foreign policy on smaller, less powerful Member States is considered to be more profound [Alecu de Flers, Müller 2012, p. 23].

The second comment refers to the nature of the ad extra (beyond Europe) dimension. Europeanization is a process that is not limited to the EU, or even Europe at large. As Ruszkowski stressed, it is “deterioralized” and “multidirectional,” with its results visible outside the EU and Europe [Ruszkowski 2010, p. 382]. The main reason behind the EU and its Member States’ efforts to influence their surrounding environment is the desire to “have an international environment that is ordered according to European principles and procedures” [Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 10]. One may ask a seemingly naive question: why? Of course, the EU’s determination to spread European values is not the only purpose here. Of perhaps even greater importance is the goal of enabling economic co-operation, ensuring security, minimising illegal immigration and, finally, broadening Europe’s global influence. Europeanization ad extra can be provided by EU institutions, but also by Member States. Therefore, any analysis of the EU’s common position in external relations should take into consideration:

- bilateral relations of particular MS with so-called third countries (for example, special relations between Germany and Israel or strategic relations between Great Britain and the United States);
- a state’s membership in other international organisations (such as NATO) and the implications of this organisation’s policy or position with regard to the analysed case.

When writing about Europeanization “beyond Europe,” some scholars [Ruszkowski 2010; Schimmelfennig 2009] point to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as an example of an institutionalised, normative tool that is designed to influence areas outside Europe. Of course, its creators perceive it as an integrated, coherent form of projecting the EU’s influence into the surrounding regions [for more, see: Casier 2010, p. 99-112]. However, it was not long before the nature of the ENP changed as a number of “multilateral initiatives”
(such as Union for the Mediterranean or the Eastern Partnership) were introduced. These initiatives are often interpreted as expressions of some Member States’ ambitions to shape EU policy toward their neighbouring countries and regions.

Another example of ad extra Europeanization comes in the shape of the EU enlargement process. As is well known, it is a long, multi-stage undertaking. Its ultimate goal is to grant a state a full membership status. However, before this can be done, the candidate has to fulfil numerous requirements and adapt (in a broad and deep sense of this word) to EU standards. Interestingly, enlargement is often quoted as one of the biggest (if not the biggest) successes of EU foreign policy [Bindi, Shapiro 2010, p. 345]. The analysis of determinants and consequences of the enlargement process in the context of particular Member States’ foreign policies remains a very interesting research area. Further academic work on this issue might help to verify a popular hypothesis that EU enlargement is Western Europe’s noble answer to the aspirations of the poorer, historically disadvantaged countries of Eastern Europe.

**Mechanisms and effects**

In the more in-depth studies, one can find specific methodological tools designed to indicate and measure the impact of Europeanization on national foreign policies. One of the first well-known proposals that is often cited was presented by M.E. Smith in an article entitled *Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact on EU foreign policy co-operation*. The model points out four ways of national/domestic adaptation to political cooperation within the EU. Smith argues that of key importance are: (1) elite socialization, (2) bureaucratic reorganization, (3) constitutional change and, finally, (4) public opinion’s reaction to political cooperation [Smith 2000, p. 617-627]. Later conceptualizations of Europeanization’s impact on national foreign policies were similarly focused on (1) domestic institutional change, (2) policy change in terms of new policy content, and (3) identity change involving elite and possible mass opinion socialization [Ladrech 2010, p. 195-198]. However, a question that should be answered is when and why political elites in
EU MS agree to changes. Moumoutzis argues that "national foreign policy-makers choose to incorporate EU foreign norms, practices and procedures into their policies either because they have become convinced that it is appropriate or because they have calculated that it is utility-maximizing to do so." In other words, socialization occurs simply as a result of strategic calculation [Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608, 617].

The conclusion from the above discussion is that Europeanization is mostly about "socialization" / "learning" or "adaptation." Alecu de Flers and Müller stressed two basic mechanisms of MS national foreign policies Europeanization. The first one, unsurprisingly, is "socialization," understood as a

process whereby actors of a given community are inducted into the community's rules, norms, and policy paradigms and which (...) causes the actors to acquire supranational attitudes in the sense that common European goals are eventually pursued [Alecu de Flers, Müller 2012, p. 24].

The second one is "learning" which needs to take place in EU institutions imbued with a culture of consensus seeking and information sharing. "Learning" is a complex category which can be conceptualised in three different ways [Alecu de Flers, Müller 2012, p. 28]. The political cooperation within the framework of CFSP is intergovernmental in its character, albeit it is also strongly structured, intense and fairly regular. According to Ladrech, the CFSP "provides a structured pattern of interaction, with rules and norms reinforcing and / or promoting values" [Ladrech 2010, p. 201]. The interacting entities are, of course, the Member States. In such a view, the CFSP is a useful formula by which MS can introduce their perspectives and preferences, learn from each other and, if need be, share their national resources.

Although the above proposals constituted vital steps towards a fuller understanding of Europeanization of foreign policies, their authors seemed to have overlooked a very important element of the puzzle. They did not examine the circumstances under which this "new European quality" emerges. Who or what drives the development and institutionalisation of the CFSP? What is the role of particular MS in this process? These questions have often been raised by researchers of
EU MS national foreign policies,\textsuperscript{4} who frequently analysed this field through the lens of realism.

The discourse on Europeanization, particularly in an age of economic crisis, used to be of an evaluative, normative character. “Europeanized” meant “changed according to European values,” so the process was often perceived as generally positive. Many authors write about a transformation through which MS can better adapt to the circumstances of their membership [Grosse 2012a, p. 22], or about Europeanization accompanying the process of democratisation. Scarcely any thought or methodological reflection is devoted to the possibility of the negative consequences of Europeanization. Hence, the reality these works describe is somewhat incomplete. Grosse points out this problem when he states that apart from positive outcomes, such as “increased capabilities for achieving national foreign policy goals by using European instruments,” this phenomenon can result in “the weakening of national administrative and political structures, particularly the capability to conduct a long-term policy designed to pursue national interests” [Grosse 2012a, p. 22]. In his opinion, such tendencies may occur if a country “is a passive object of the Europeanization process, and focuses merely on the correct implementation of EU norms (...) without participating properly in creating them.” In such a case, the Europeanization of national foreign policy is dominated by top-down processes. This may lead to a gradual objectification of a given country. Its influence on the shape and course of Europeanization diminishes, while at the same time it becomes increasingly susceptible to penetration of the national institutional system and decision-making mechanisms. The growing asymmetry of Europeanization and dominance of one of its dimensions may cause disillusionment and frustration. Consequently, the entire integration process may be delegitimized – as shown by the current situation in Greece, Portugal or Slovenia.

Finally, another missing piece of research on Europeanization is the potential process of EU disintegration of deconstruction. Even if one considers it a highly improbable scenario, one has to admit that the possibility of a Member State leaving the Union (as may be

\textsuperscript{4} Sometimes, the category of “European policy” is discerned from the entire national foreign policy.
the case with the UK) or being expelled because of the intentional and repeated breaches of EU regulations (Greece) is more likely. This aspect, however, is almost entirely missing from the academic discourse – a fact that should be noted as a serious shortcoming. Alecu de Flers and Müller only briefly mention “de-Europeanization” when they state that “EU MS may fall back on their own resources and individual strategies during political crisis or after changes in government (...)” [Alecu de Flers, Müller 2012, p. 24]. Having this problem in mind, one should keep in mind the above eventualities when designing research on European issues.

Structural realism and the Europeanization of foreign policy – an attempt at synthesis

In studies and analyses devoted to the subject of Europeanization [for more, see: Pacześniak, Riedel 2010], authors have often made use of various theoretical concepts. When analysing foreign policy, they reached for paradigms of international relations – usually employing liberalism and constructivism, while practically putting aside realism. This resulted in a peculiar phenomenon that one might call a “hybrid approach” to analysing the foreign policies of European states. Publications on foreign policy in general have always made note of the realist perspective, while in works on the Europeanization of foreign policy the very same perspective, if mentioned at all, was marginalised. At the same time, when engaging in classical analyses of European states’ foreign policies (for example examinations of bilateral relations), scholars have largely overlooked the influence of the EU and European integration. It seems, therefore, that combining realism (as a long-standing research approach in international politics) with the concept of Europeanization (viewed primarily as stemming from empirical research) is not only possible, but also potentially very useful. If successful, this effort can help to fill the gaps in the above-mentioned research perspectives, and hence make the analysis of EU Member States’ foreign policy more comprehensive (table 3).
Table 3. Structural realism and the concept of Europeanization – convergent and divergent aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Structural realism</th>
<th>Europeanization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character of the analysis</td>
<td>Systems analysis</td>
<td>Systems analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of the system</td>
<td>Anarchic</td>
<td>Anarchic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects of the analysis</td>
<td>States in the international system</td>
<td>EU Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What shapes the behaviour of subjects</td>
<td>Raison d’état / power</td>
<td>Raison d’état / power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of interactions</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of the analysis</td>
<td>Foreign policy as activities oriented toward the pursuit of national interests</td>
<td>The impact of integration on a state’s behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant form of interactions between participants</td>
<td>Bilateral relations</td>
<td>Multilateral relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own work.

In a very interesting paper, Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse claims that although Europe is now highly integrated and EU institutions have gained substantial solidity, the realist-minded rivalry between Member States should not be overlooked [Grosse 2005, p. 72]. In his opinion, realism allows us to analyse not only foreign policy, but also, from several points of view, the phenomenon of integration. First of all, it makes it possible to consider integration as a rivalry between particular EU MS – a process aimed at balancing capabilities, especially among the most powerful players (Germany, France, Great Britain). Secondly, cooperation in the EU can be viewed as an example of how a “regional system of dominance” (in this case, of course, it means the dominance of some European countries over others) is created. In such system, the position of its most powerful actors is increasingly strong, while weaker players experience a growing pressure on adaptation. Thirdly, European integration (particularly in its political dimension) may be perceived as an effort to achieve a balance of power in the global system – in other words, it can be analysed through the lens of Europe’s rivalry with other regions, alliances or groups (for instance, the BRICS countries) [Grosse 2005, p. 82-83].

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Looking at the subject of national foreign policies from a different angle, it seems necessary to take account of the importance of the increasingly consolidated EU foreign policy. As was mentioned before, the CFSP remains an area of cooperation governed by rules different from those applicable to economic integration. It is much more decentralised, with the intergovernmental approach as the dominant form of cooperation. It lacks powerful supranational institutions legitimised to make decisions autonomously that would have any significant impact on the MS. Hence, the CFSP can be considered a (largely structured and institutionalised) mechanism for co-ordinating national foreign policies. It provides a framework for the European system of political cooperation. Taking this argument further, this European system should be perceived as an element (a subsystem) within the structure of the broader international environment (figure 1).

Figure 1. Scheme of the international system from the EU perspective

Source: own work.

The foreign policies of EU Member States are most certainly influenced not only by the sole fact of their membership, but also by EU foreign policy as well. Conversely, EU policy, as well as the institutions created to shape and implement it, are influenced by MS.
However, one should remember that although integration is now very advanced (as it results in comprehensive consensus- and position-building mechanisms), “there are still two separate levels of foreign policy: the national and the European” [Grosse 2005, p. 89]. When analysing one of these levels, one has to take account the other – this is where the concept of Europeanization may be used as an analytical tool. One should also keep in mind that these two levels are not equal. Common European foreign policy is only possible if legitimised by MS – in other words, if it is convergent with the interests of (at least) the most powerful actors. As Bindi and Shapiro put it: “if there is no consensus, there is no policy” [Bindi, Shapiro 2010, p. 346]. One circumstance that may facilitate the development of EU foreign policy is a hypothetical future situation in which some of the weaker MS lose the ability to effectively conduct their national foreign policies, or they will be so dependent on the Union (or its most powerful members) that in order to assure their own security, they will consent to the major players taking the political initiative.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, it can be plausibly stated that there are no profound differences between structural realism and Europeanization that would render the synthesis of these two approaches impossible. Having in mind the above considerations, one can assume that studies on Europeanization, focused on organisational and procedural aspects [Grosse 2012b, p. 30-31], may serve to complement neorealist theory for explaining contemporary international politics. Research on Europeanization may be very useful in explaining the course of interactions between EU Member States, as well as between the EU and the rest of the world. It provides us with analytical models which can be utilised to examine patterns and cycles emerging within the phenomena and events subjected to research. Still, the conclusions stemming from research on Europeanization do not permit us to answer questions about the motivation exhibited by actors involved in the international system. They are also insufficient to clearly identify subjects of this system and determine their roles. This is where structural realism can be used, as it offers an orderly, cause-and-effect-based
vision of the world. More than that, it also delivers a ready system of definitions of the key concepts which we use to describe our reality.

The scenario where national foreign policies of the 28 EU MS are replaced by one, common EU foreign policy does not seem particularly probable. Most likely, Member States will not give up the “last bastion of their sovereignty” without serious resistance on their part. Foreign policy will therefore remain the domain of states, while the mechanisms of the CFSP will be used for the pursuit of national interests. What we can expect is progress in socialization that is likely to occur in the process of Europeanization. Member States will learn how to act efficiently in the labyrinth of EU institutions, mutual dependencies and particular interests. Their power and position within the system will depend on their ability to adapt to these conditions. In other words, “the basic function of a sovereign government will be not so much to express the independent nature of the state and its legal order, but to protect national interests in the conditions of openness and interdependence” [Bielen 2003, p. 44]. However, it is possible that the global environment will bring forth problems and challenges of fundamental importance, and that European countries will no longer wish (or be able) to tackle them alone, or even in small, two- or three-strong groups. In such a case, we will be forced to comprehensively reshape key definitions by which we describe the international environment. Until that happens, sovereignty, national security and raison d'état shall remain valid concepts to be used in the political debate in EU MS, while realism will continue to be a useful instrument for analysing and explaining the course of international politics.

The attempt to combine structural realism and the concept of Europeanization can be also treated as a voice in the debate over both of these theoretical proposals. On the one hand, it is often said that neorealism “overly focuses on states and underestimates other participants of international politics, while it also overlooks (...) social and economic factors as well as the role of international organisations, transnational and integration processes” [Dyduch, Mikiewicz, Rzeszónko 2006, p. 22]. Although most of these caveats can be dismissed after a thorough examination of Waltz’s works (especially those published over the last two decades), by supplementing neorealism with the set of instruments included in Europeanization, one can make these critical arguments even more irrelevant.
The above-described proposed model for analysing foreign policy\(^5\) should not be treated as an element of the so-called “inter-paradigm debate.” This undertaking – an attempt at combining or choosing certain parts of theories (realism, liberalism, possibly constructivism) depending on the particular need for a suitable concept – is something of a misguided effort. Replicating it here might result in a chaotic analysis of available sources, and hence make it impossible to provide readers with any meaningful overall conclusions or assessments. Each of the above-mentioned concepts differs in how it describes human nature and political organisation [Borkowski 2012, p. 25], each uses a different “set of conceptual and operational definitions” [for more, see: Frankfort-Nachmias, Nachmias 2001, p. 44-48]. This article refers mainly to the realist paradigm which encompasses various theories – the one chosen as a linchpin for my considerations is Waltz’s structural realism. Europeanization (when taken as a theoretical concept), meanwhile, does not refer to the nature, characteristics and motivations of subjects. Instead, it provides us with abstract generalisations on the behaviour of nation-states involved in the process of integration. As Ruszkowski admits, Europeanization as a research agenda that combines internal and European decision-making processes at the centre of various policies, turns out to be an “extremely useful starting point for improving our understanding of changes that occur in policies of Member States as a result of their EU membership” [Ruszkowski 2012, p. 99].

In the final passage of this article, I shall once again turn to Kenneth Waltz, on whose work my deliberations are largely based. Although Waltz himself valued theories mostly for their power to explain, rather than to predict, it is hardly deniable that the scenarios and predictions he produced in the 1990s have proven remarkably correct.

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5 The category of a “model” should be understood as an “abstract representation of reality in such a way so as to order and simplify our view of a given reality, by recreating its basic features. (...) A model describes those characteristics of the real world that have the biggest relevance for the examined problem. It allows us to explain vital connections between these characteristics and build empirically verifiable statements as to the nature of these connections” [Frankfort-Nachmias, Nachmias 2001, p. 59].
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