Jadwiga Maria Staniszkis
Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences
e-mail: horyzonty.polityki@ignatianum.edu.pl
DOI: 10.17399/HP.2016.072101

The East-West Split in View of the History of Ideas

Abstract

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: Authoress looks for “paradigm of Russianness” – i.e. stable elements in the different phases of Russian history. She finds it on the meta-level as the constant, repetitive mechanism of selection and interpretation of borrowings from the West. It is joined with the mechanism of civilization East-West divide. Authoress opposes Western Nominalism to the construct that defines to as Byzantine Nominalism or ontology of hypostases (with the “proper existence” that must be “extracted”) and Gnosticism (i.e. the assumption that knowledge concerning of this ontology gives title to power). The Russian borrowings from the Reformation is an example of the operation of this mechanism of selection and interpretation. It allows to extract, from the doctrine of predestination, knowledge about the causal relationships in time (and full flexibility of this time), and from the Thomistic ontology – will as an element of the extracting of the “proper existence.” It has created a “genotype of revolutionariness” present in Russia until modern times. From this perspective, special relationships between Russia and Germany join with a diagnosis intellectual kinship of Russia with Germany – by the influence of Byzantine Nominalism on Germany (and of course via Mohylen Academy – on Russia) and easier for this reason acceptance

1 This article is a result of research conducted within the framework of the research project funded by the Narodowe Centrum Nauki (National Science Centre) under the agreement UMO-2013/11/B/HS1/04144, realized in Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.

in Russia borrowings from German. Until Marxism with his hypostasis being in itself and being for itself.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The presented research problem concerns the specifics of Russia in the context of the history of ideas, with sources of this specificity – found in early Christianity and in the split to the East and the West. There have been applied the methods of sociological analysis of history, anthropology of power, and comparative analysis.

THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: After having initially defined the aim of the study, the fundamental concepts and terms. Then they were taken preliminary considerations on the paradigm of Russianness (genesis) and developing of this category (deconstruction). This issue was presented in the form of the historical process. A further part of the study describes the phenomenon of the Russian revolutionary mentality. At the end of research deliberations have been presented the problem of secularization and the differences in this process between the West and Russia.

RESEARCH RESULTS: The result of the study is to clarify the influence of ancient and medieval Christian ideas on the development “paradigm of Russianness” and Russian “genotype of revolutionariness” in the context of the division of Europe into the East and West. With the “distorting mirror” between East and West rather than the Russian “specificity.”

CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The setting a European frame of reference (mainly Reformation and Counter-Reformation as well as lack in Russia of Augustinian concept of subject and Roman vision of the authonomy of form) as the main “axis” of Russian history is a perspective field of research (research proposal). This field allows to avoid simplifying stereotypical interpretations – focusing on describing the civilizational dissimilarity of Russia, as a separated world, and external signs of Russian imperialism, as a major carriers of sense of the Russian history and its interpretation.

KEYWORDS:
- Secularization, Russia, East, West, Christianity, Gnosticism,
- Split, Western Nominalism, Byzantine Nominalism “Proper Existence”, “Paradigm of Russianness”, Genotype of Revolutionariness

INTRODUCTION

The title issue discussed in this publication is pivotal to an in-depth understanding of the East-West dynamics of Europe, and especially
The East-West Split in View of the History of Ideas

for defining the Russia’s place on the map of Europe. In order to make this analysis more efficient let me start by outlining three model situations.

**Situation 1.** Germany – Russia, 19th century: two forms of nihilism. The main focus here is on two fundamentally different reactions to the human inability to meet the challenge of the dual nature of Christ, who exists as both man and the son of God. This nature is hypostatic in principle as it refers to the consubstantiality of both entities, where one elicits the other. This dogma can be found in the teaching of both the Orthodox Church and the Reformation. Nietzsche states that this existential situation should be perceived as optimistic tragedy, as Nietzsche’s nihilism is constructivist; man, unable to transcend his limitations must keep testing them and expand through the creation of new laws and institutions. Playing with form and Calvinist “artificiality.” In Russia the response was significantly different; once the “deification” of man proves to be impossible, the consistence of the world disintegrates and, as a result, there are no restraints. This anarchic nihilism of the void, free from an active subject and autonomous form, expresses one of the key dimensions of the East-West division line.

**Situation 2.** England-Russia, with an essential belief that Russian thought was being influenced by pre-nominalistic work from the 13th century English Franciscans, part of the dispute on the problem of universals. It was emphasised here, however, that a system is primarily a combination of various logics, and not beings, and “logical order” and “organic order” can be distinguished in respect of the same entity. Here the contradictions between concepts (symbols in Russia) are more prominent than they are in reality; see “metaphysical universals” as defined by Duns Scotus, constituting a presage of the later post-secular assumptionism of Kant. Russian theology recognised these concepts with their subject-free dynamics and the construct of hypostasis, constitutive for Eastern Christianity. In England the response to this insurmountable hiatus between the two modes of existence of the same entity, which might be the reminiscence of Diocletian’s empire, was centuries later adopted by Locke who stated that only the freedom of thinking of the subject as a cognitive opportunity may result in closing this gap. In Russia, on the other hand, there was a different reaction. It was assumed here that only
arbitrariness and imposed hierarchical convention (systematization) may lead to a resolution of the problem.

**Situation 3. Germany – Russia, a double distorting mirror.** Later on in this publication the issue of the impact of selected aspects of Reformation (and also Counter-Reformation) in Russia will be discussed further. This phenomenon resulted from Russia’s intuitive perception of common origins, due to the influence that Eastern Christianity had on Lutheranism. But as a point of reference, Russia used hypostasis and Gnosticism, which was the second time the foundations of Eastern Christianity had been used, giving birth to completely different content than was produced in the West. In Russia the doctrine of predestination was interpreted as lack of causative relationships in time and is the motion of time being malleable. Counter-Reformation, in the Thomistic version, brought out the moment of a will, crucial for the extraction of the “proper existence” from a being. This led to the establishment of the genotype of revolutionariness; it has kept re-emerging in Russia in various periods of its history. These same motifs in the Western Reformation became the foundation of the Protestant ethic which primarily meant being self-imposed by the moral order. In Russia, however, the same ideas constituted the basis for the radical change implemented by a force in which an individual is merely a tool.

In my opinion even these three situations bring some light to the East-West schism, as they emphasise the dissimilarities of intellectual experience in the two regions (the issue of a subject and the form). At the same time, they point out to the distortions – alternative meanings – caused by the Russian’s use of Byzantine Nominalism, primarily hypostasis and Gnosticism, to interpret Western borrowings. And all the while borrowing only those ideas which – intuitively – seemed familiar.

That is why the history of ideas is of such significance for the understanding of that division. The important elements include:

- Eastern Christianity rejecting the Hellenic conception of the subject;
- Codification, within the Byzantine Nominalism of hypostasis, with its ontology of consubstantiality, and Gnosticism, with its hierarchy of knowledge, as the basic principles used later to select and interpret the notions borrowed from the West;
Lack of Western experience of Augustinism in Russia; the experience juxtaposing the a priori Gnostic knowledge with individual, personalised thinking. The subject, observing their own thinking and creating their own unique individuality;

Strong influence of the Byzantine Nominalism in Russia, completely different than Western Nominalism. It has nothing in common with the tedious Western process of establishing correspondence between the world of ideas and the world of tangible reality, the process evidenced through endeavours to improve existing forms, including laws and institutions. And, as a result, society becomes consolidated as one collective entity. But in the Byzantine Nominalism, where the narrative of the level 1 only provides the key to the actual correct narrative of the level 2, the hypostatic relationship of consubstantiality leads to the transformation of both elements and hypostatic unity achieved through shared will, existential truth and completeness.

It was the will which, in this approach, was supposed to facilitate manipulation of time and extracting the “proper existence.” This was accompanied by dogmatism and very specific pragmatism at the same time, combined with an anti-platonic, hypostatic approach to existing ideas, treating them as a narrative designed to present the meaning and teach the role on the second hidden level, but never to be implemented in its literal sense. The identity was perceived here in the perspective of antinomian unity, in which any extremes are regarded complementing the united whole, and conflict merely means facilitating the transformation of both parties. The Aristotelian approach to the difference cannot be included here as the entire area is determined by both the identity and the sense, with transforming conflict perceived as a tool used towards consubstantiality, ontological cooperation and hence not sameness and current, empirical effects. This approach even allows for the possibility of the existence of evil because it elicits good in the future. This revolutionary relativism of moral judgement and Russian rejection of matters associated with the inalienable dignity of a human being, resulting from the absence of the idea of the subject, despite the adoption of certain elements of Thomism, constitute the important characteristics of the “paradigm of Russianness.” Onthologisation of the will was basically the sole remainder of Thomism in Russia.
On this unique background Poland appears to be functioning at the periphery of the West and the East, existing as an outskirt territory for both. Consequently it adopts superficiality and ritualization in order to survive and accommodate for obvious, theological and civilizational contradictions. It was drawn towards the Russian anarchic void rather than to Western, constructivist nihilism of defining and testing humans’ own limitations through the creation of institutions and the law, influenced by the reminiscences of the theology of responsibility (still worth trying!), only on the collective level and in extreme situations. This aspect differed from the Protestant ethic where it was the significant daily functioning of an individual. The notions of revolt of the masses were strong, additionally reinforced by the rusticity, locality and general social advancement that occurred during the communist era. Additionally, the values considered to be “elite” were also attacked, including the idea of freedom regulated by the law. The focus was on the substantial justice, rather than the formal concept thereof. There were many misconceptions regarding the Western dictate of a form, resulting from the lack of Roman Empire tradition and, paradoxically, also the lack of any experience of Russian, Eastern-Christian consubstantiality and deep faith in the prospect of transformation. So the Russian genotype of revolutionariness was replaced in Poland with the genotype of survival, even at the cost of further lowering standards. Consequently, further ritualization and focus on customs and ceremonies was observed, as opposed to the Augustinian imperative of observing our own thought process, which was most uncommon in Poland.

Paradoxically, these specific features, including superficiality, deficit of theology, emphasis on rituals and concepts of what constitutes the correct and incorrect order and made sixteenth and seventeenth century Poland one of the channels through which Western ideas accessed Russia. The religious dogmas did not have such an effect; they remained essentially different in the West and the East, even regarding the personalistic, Western concept of the Holy Trinity contrasted with present in Eastern Christianity processual hypostatic notion of eliciting the “proper existence” within the Trinity. All this shaped the “paradigm of Russianness,” which combines, as will be discussed later, basic concepts of opposing nature, which were adopted in Russia without the understanding of these very
differences. These concepts were further integrated into a coherent cluster, thanks to their both being interpreted using the same perspective of East Christian Gnosticism and hypostasis. Thus, when brutal religious wars were taking place in Western Europe, Russia viewed Poland as an example of tolerance; this was only possible thanks to its superficiality and its being on the “outskirts” of both approaches. To express it in a different way, the lack of understanding of dogmatic differences in Poland was significant, as noted by the leading theologian of that time, Hugo Grotius, and then criticised by Pierre Bayle who stressed that religion requires secrets, (*Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 1695).

This lack of understanding was caused by a superficial rationalization of religion, as well as its focus in Poland on social aspects. On the other hand a contributing factor was somewhat conscious and typical for Eastern Christian pragmatism expressed for example by utilising the language of the side with which a compromise is to be established. The Polish Brethren – supporters of the Reformation – were not the only group who referred to Eastern Christianity’s vision of the invisible church and in Racovian Catechism used the letters of St. Paul, immensely important for the East, but even the Jesuits, in their mission to the East, supporting the Union of Brest (1596), interpreted Thomism using the concept of will close in its interpretation to that expressed in Eastern Christianity.

This interpretation of the Counter-Reformation, often referred to as “the new Thomism,” took root in the Mohyla Academy in Kyiv, an institution at which professor Jaworski “the Jesuit” employed, who was an advisor to Peter the Great. Later it became a part of the wider construct, defined in this article as “the genotype of revolutionariness.” This interpretation, focussed on will, was widely adopted in Russia, because it worked well the concept of the Holy Spirit functioning in Eastern Christianity, which was disputed in the West.

Therefore the concord and synthesis of various religions proved easier in Eastern Europe than in the West. The reasons for that phenomenon was the superficiality facilitating pragmatic compromises, as the depths of dogmatic differences seemed to be overlooked. This was noticed by a preacher from Lviv, Stanislaw Sokolowski who, in 1582, wrote in a paper dedicated to Pope Gregory XIII “the city took on the rites of all religions... and yet... it has hardly been touched
by the heresies of our era…” (Jobert, 1974). Political context was also of great significance: Ivan the Terrible sent his memorials to Rome, asking the Pope to intercede in ending the Polish-Russian war, which would allow Russia to join the anti-Turkish (anti-Islam) alliance.

It was a Polish envoy in Moscow who facilitated the relationship between the churches during this period. Pope Clement VIII, previously a legate in Poland, in the Magnus Dominus papal bulla of 1596, approving the provisions of the Union of Brest, emphasized common political interests and rather avoided more theological matters, including dispute on Filioque, dating back to the 11th century, crucial for the dissent between Western and Eastern Christianity.

There was another figure who played a significant role in the process of the inroads being made by Western ideas into Russia, admittedly in their simplified form as they were filtered through the perspective of Eastern Gnosticism and hypostasis: Peter Mohyla (1596-1647). His work, and the work of the National University in Kiev, was often associated with criticism of Polish unconscious dogmatic tolerance expressed in the Union of Brest but, on the other hand, it provided the interpretation of the Reformation and the Jesuit Counter-Reformation, which together established the stance emphasizing the malleability of time and the moment of will, both essential for the “paradigm of Russianness.”

At the same time, the influence of syncretism, referring to the tradition of the Roman Empire and the Emperor Constantine, was stronger in Poland than in Russia. For that reason, establishing the structure which would comprise a range of various traditions and completely ignore the original, dogmatic differences, was not possible. In Poland the main emphasis was placed on superficiality, rituals and compromise based on monotheism, with the use of the Eastern Christian perspective of the “proper existence” in this regard. Tolerance stemming from ignorance, aversion to authority and thus avoiding disputes that would lead to them, going along with different interpretations of the Holy Trinity, including the Western, personalistic one and the Eastern, hypostasis one, in the name of monotheism, made Poland convenient and convincing interpreter of the West in Russia, including the concepts of Reformation and Counter-Reformation. This tendency was strengthened by the fact that political efforts of the Polish aristocracy and the King, were focussed on an attempt
to achieve compromise, while Western Europe was at war over the principles.

Poland was similar to Russia in its ability to reconcile the opposites and remain on the outskirts as a result of superficiality and the perspective of antinomy rather than straightforward contradiction, thus treating conflict as a tool used to elicit “proper existence.” This meant that Poland constituted an effective channel of deformed westernisation of Russia and allowed it to keep its intact and superficial (compared to the Byzantine Nominalism discussed later on) easternness, both in Poland, and Russia.

1. SEARCHING FOR THE “PARADIGM OF RUSSIANNESS” IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCULATION OF IDEAS; FIRST APPROACH

Bearing in mind the information presented in the opening paragraphs of this paper, my contribution to the understanding of Russia can be expressed in several theses, which will be elaborated on further in this text.

Firstly, the constant element of the “paradigm of Russianness” is the **mechanism of selection and interpretation of the borrowings**, recurrent in history until today. It stems from the intellectual formation based on Gnosticism and epistemology, as well as ontology of the **hypostasis**. I refer to it as the **Byzantine Nominalism**, typical of Eastern Christianity, but also present later, in the secular mentality of this civilization.

Secondly, the **intellectual context** that is typical for the specific history of ideas in that culture, equally important for the interpretation and systematic deformation of these borrowings, was completely different in Russia compared with the West.

On the one hand it may be perceived as “anti-personalism,” caused by the rejection of the Hellenic tradition of the individual in Eastern Christianity, the absence of an early-Augustinian concept of a subject, changing and maturing through the reflection on their own thinking and lack of experience of Western Nominalism, with its searching finding and establishing a “correspondence” between
the world of ideas and the world of tangible reality. Consequently, the collective entity, society, was not consolidated in this process. The manifestation and apogee of that anti-personalism was the dispute regarding the *Filioque*, focussed on the issue of the Holy Trinity (united entity or three separate existences), which ultimately divided Eastern and Western Christianity. On the other hand, it was the lack of any Russian and Eastern European experience of the autonomy of the form, known in the West, which had been influencing the Western way of thinking, also regarding the authority ever since the Roman Empire (Diocletian reforms in the 3rd century) (Williams, 1985; Staniszkis, 2012) and the Council of Nicaea under Constantine (4th century AD) (Ch. Matson Odahl, 2004).

Additionally, the situation resembles a double, distorting mirror, especially in the Russia – Germany relationship, when the similarities can be intuitively perceived, as well as all the differences, which might be challenging to pinpoint without the use of philosophical terminology. For Russia recognised in Reformation the resonance of Byzantine Nominalism, for example in hypostasis of consubstantiality of faith and grace or in the notions of “justification by faith” and “freedom without free will” deeply rooted in Lutheranism and the thought of St. Paul’s. This is precisely why Lutheranism and certain elements of Calvinism were so easily accepted, even if “rationalization,” one of the ideas present in the teachings of John Calvin, originally defined as a social process forming a collective entity, in Peter

2 The dispute over the text of the *Filioque* (Confession of faith) arose around the sixth century and permanently divided Christianity in the eleventh century, when Rome finally adopted the Triune interpretation. As early as 866 A.D. Photius described it as “the culmination of evil” devastating the “monarchy of the Father and the principle of hypostatic existence” (Meyendorff, 1984, p. 118; Yuga, 1926; Beck, 1959). The Eastern concept of the Holy Trinity as “the hypostasis of hypostases” was formulated by Maximus the Confessor, *Epistola ad Marinum* (Meyendorff, 1984, p. 120); and Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century, *Traktat apodyktyczny* (“Gregoriou tou Palama Syggrammata”, 1962, p. 37).

3 During Diocletian era the functions of power were divided within the Empire (each of them on the scale the whole territory), which prevented the schism and addressed the issue of cooperation and correspondence between aspects of the whole for the first time, developed later as part of the Western Nominalism (“The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire”, 1976).
the Great’s time,4 was modified into a statutory concept of “service society” – created from above. It was imposed in Russia in the name of the Gnostic hierarchy based on knowledge and referred to impersonal rationality of control facilitating the development of “autocracy,” rather than Western, nominalist, post-Calvinist, subjective category of “correspondence.”

Those borrowed concepts of Reformation were then further processed and reinterpreted in Russia, paradoxically using the same tools (hypostasis, Gnosticism) as before; these have already influenced the nature of these Reformation notions through the pre-Lutheran relations between Byzantium and the West. All this led to the emergence of the thesis of the double distorting mirror. Therefore, once the doctrine of predestination, which originally took into account the lack of connection between the deeds of a man and his salvation, had been interpreted through the lens of hypostases in Russia, what emerged was a vision of complete malleability of time and absence of causative relationships. On the other hand, Thomistic Counter-Reformation, interpreted through the same perspective of Byzantine Nominalism but also with the enrichment of Polish Jesuits’ “new Thomism”, a moment of “will” was carefully extracted as a crucial element in the process of eliciting the “proper existence.” Both of these threads later became the foundation of the Russian “genotype of revolutionariness”, in the right- and left-wing version.

In addition, what seemed to be typical for Russia was the absence of any organic, independently considered process of secularisation. What took place instead was the independent adoption of various for different time periods, Western theological notions and elements of secular political philosophies, including the Enlightenment, the thought of Hegel and Marx. It was done without careful consideration of the issue of continuity and continuation between them, as was done in the West, but also without taking into account a fundamental change following the rejection of the Absolute. This led to a unique oscillation that exists in Russia even today: religious ideas tend to

---

4 Regards Table of Ranks published in Russia in 1722, supporting the principle of “regular state” (Lotman, 2010, part I; “Pamyatniki russkogo prava”, 1961). The formula of “service society” has been mitigated in the requisition of Peter III of 1762 (Lotman, 2010, p. 44).
be used as a means of control, and elements of secular philosophies as quasi-religious dogmas. Leninism, and communism in general, functioned in Russia almost as neo-traditionalist solution to the dilemmas of Russian religiousness, insoluble in its traditional model (“Research Series”, Institute of International Studies, No. 37, 1978; Staniszkis, 1984), including the imperative of “deification”, according to Leninism achievable solely at the level of a class and through class conflict, with the avangarde seen as a group functioning at the top of the Gnostic hierarchy of knowledge.

2. SECRET MAP OF EUROPE

In the search for an axis dividing Europe into East and West, applying the history of ideas for this purpose is indisputably an ambitious task. It is impossible for a researcher to take up this challenge alone, also due to the breadth of knowledge required. My humble input here will comprise the formulation of a number of hypotheses and the introduction of an alternative approach to the issue being discussed, as well as its contemporary implications.

At first glance, there are two obvious axes of this division: the issues of the form and the subject.

The conventional West is a non-theoretisized dictate of the form in the Diocletian’s reforms and the later Council of Nicaea during Constantine’s rule, when taking the position on the autonomy of the form (or its versions), allowed the emperor to justify the syncretism and to maintain the legitimacy of his authority, while managing to distance himself from the doctrinal disputes arising within the church. The West is also the observation of the Visigoths’ king, Ataulf, as recorded by the chroniclers (“Historiae adversus paganos”, 1889). After conquering Rome in the 5th century he stated that he would leave the imperial institutions intact, as he believed they added value to the authority because they transformed the orders into widely respected law. It is also a form as a task that was self-imposed by the German Emperor Otto I in the tenth century; the goal being the restoration of the Roman Empire. And, last but not least, the idea of a form closing the gap in Western Nominalism, with its Sisyphean effort to build correspondence between the world of ideas and the world of operations achieved
through the creation of institutions and the law, while strengthening the cooperation, trust and structures (corporations) forming the foundation of society. The latter concept is in open opposition to the Eastern vision of “consubstantiality” as a relation educing the “proper existence” from beings (and ideas) remaining in opposition, with the focus on antinomian unity, in which the opposites, fighting with each other actually create each other. This is rejection of Aristotelian logic and the archetype of Lenin’s later vision of the class struggle, in which the conflict is a catalyst for transformation and facilitates the experience of extreme states of consciousness and organization.

The West is finally Calvinist, the sphere of artifice, this form perfecting “rationalization” created by the people together with the collective entity that creates it. Paradoxically, Eastern Christianity was closer to the perspective of the English pre-nominalism (Copleston, 2004) stating the existence of two impersonal, different, universal logics: the sphere of ideas and the sphere of actions, with a greater continuity of this second one. It was England that got sent diptychs from Byzantium, in order to test the possibility of a community of views (but not their uniformity). This loophole had been closed however, in England, in the sixteenth century, by Locke’s idea of freedom as a cognitive situation (Locke, 1959); In Russia on the other hand, the ideas of Gnosticism and the hierarchy of knowledge was used, as well as an alternative arbitrariness.

In the conventional East, the theory and practice of autonomous forms and social effort to create of these forms did not become a constitutive experience, unlike in the West. At first, Platonism functioned as a common belief, with its vision of incarnation of the idea, where the form was considered an integral and reliant shadow (Copleston, 2004, ch. XX). Later, once this view was mediated by Plotinus (Copleston, 2004, ch. XLV), it became an epistemology of the hypostasis referring to the relationship of “consubstantiality” and a two-level existence, when the first level, also in the aspect of a form, is only a symbol, a key to understanding of the second level, aiming for completeness. In its dynamic version, the hypostatic relationship with its accompanying tension, lead to the transformation of both elements, hence their original form is treated here as irrelevant, it is perceived only as the transitional stage. Consistency is not expected here; it is to emerge later in the form of the “completeness.”
The West of today, with its regulatory shape borne out of the Lisbon Treaty (Staniszkiš, 2012; Staniszkiš 2009), is a continuation of that dictate of a form. “Open constitutionalism” (Weiler, 2003; Staniszkiš, 2012, pp. 82-86) practised in the EU with its tools that allow for integration in a multi-level, multi-cultural and multi-centre European space, accepts the syncretism of the norms and their constant reinterpretation, contextualisation and individualisation. This process includes merging freedom with arbitrariness. In the East, however, the will and the dictate of might still remain the last instance.

The difference between the West and the East is equally evident regarding the issue of the subject. The West is defined between the Hellenic concept of the subject and the seventeenth-century Puritan vision of the New Covenant, the Contract with God, also understood as appreciation of the inalienable freedom of the human being, as a party to this contract. This idea was fully articulated as the United States’ founding documents (Ostrom, 1991). The law here was a means to consolidate this freedom. The West is also the Augustinian idea of the subject observing its own thinking process, including the consequences of the confession of faith stretched to the Kantian, post-secular “assumptiveness” as subjective, conventional (typical Calvinist artificiality!), independent creation of its own moral framework. All that served with an earlier strong flavour of the Reformation and nominalism with the previously mentioned establishment of the “correspondence.” Lutheran ambivalence, came as a surprise; bearing in mind that it was Luther who, despite emphasising the nothingness of the human being, transformed an individual act of faith into a grace receiving condition. And, thereby interpreting the Eastern, hypostatic relationship of “consubstantiality,” fundamentally differently than in Russia, as the issue of a subject that was non-existent in Russia, was so heavily emphasised.

It was slightly different in Eastern Europe. The dispute about the profession of faith, key to the conflict between Eastern Christianity and Rome, which will be discussed later, relied heavily on the rejection the personal interpretation of the Holy Trinity for the benefit of processesual ontology of dynamic relations and hypostatic consubstantiality of individual elements, including Christ as the son of God and at a man the same time and the interpretation of the Holy Spirit as energy triggering this process of transformation. Another aspect of this
approach was the **unity identified with the moment of will** (subject to ontology, because it is treated as an actual reality and a manner of the existence of this **unity** passing from the Father to the Son). This aspect, complemented by the option of **substitution** of “incomplete” entities by the entity benefiting from having the Gnostic “knowledge”), later contributed towards the establishment of Bolshevism.

My proposal is, and it will be mainly presented in this paper, that it is worth looking at the West-East dissent also from a different perspective. I am not suggesting that the role of the axis outlined above, which focuses on the form and subject, should be questioned. On the contrary, I want to specify it and present the relationship of these two civilisations as a unique, double distorting mirror. This can be observed especially clearly in the Germany – Russia relationship, but also, albeit differently, between France and Russia, where the influence of the Age of Enlightenment was treated as an echo of Calvinist rationalization. And finally, the relation between England and Russia. The conclusions drawn from impersonal ontology were radically different: freedom in England and arbitrariness in Russia.

In the case of Germany – Russia relation the dynamics differed. On the one hand the impact of Eastern Christianity, combined with the construct to which I refer as the Byzantine Nominalism, based on hypostasis and Gnosticism, on the Lutheran Reformation can be clearly observed. On the other hand, we can see the role of the same **construct** in the process of selection and interpretation of the content later adopted by Russia from the reformation environment. Deformation of this content was caused in Russia, not only because of the different context, including the aforementioned issue of the form and the subject, but literally interpreting it through the perspective of hypostasis and Gnosticism, which had already had left their mark here in the distant past. Similarities and deformities, simultaneous sense of intimacy and strangeness, can all only be understood by referring to the **doubleness of mutual reflections in the distorting mirrors**. The consequences of this aspect of the history of ideas can be still noticed in the relation between Russia and Germany. Therefore, when in the last phase of communism, the Russian elites, including Yuri Andropov,\(^5\)

---

\(^5\) Mentioned by Volkogonov in his biography of Andropov, excerpt published in “Izvestiya” 1996, not included in the final book. Information from Lacis’
Jadwiga Maria Staniszki

debated on how the country could get within the zone of Western civilization’s influence, two options were considered: it could be done through Greece and the issue of Hellenistic subject or through Germany with its Augustinian subject and the law.

3. THE PARADIGM OF RUSSIANNESS: GENESIS

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the paradigm of Russianness, which I wish to reconstruct and explain, in my opinion comprises of a mechanism of selection and interpretation of borrowings from the West that is constant and recurrent in various points of Russian history. These interpretations are often contradictory. It is not only the constantly used epistemological perspective, but ever reproducing instruction of how to think and act in the search of currently applicable vector and means of expression. Its genesis is combined with the deficit of Russia’s own theology, key to the intellectual history of the country. And, above all, with the concept I refer to as the Byzantine Nominalism, essentially different from the concept of Western Nominalism. The differences can be found in ontology; in other words what is considered to be “real,” the concept/place of the subject as well as the approach to time, with the “proper existence” only as a thing of the future and disregard for the present empirical experiences, and meta-rules of thought proceeding. The most striking feature of Eastern Christianity and the Byzantine Nominalism is therefore its processuality. This is confirmed in the dispute regarding the concept of the Holy Trinity, key for the division between Western and Eastern Christianity. In Eastern Christianity, including the Orthodox, the concept of the Holy Trinity functions as the model of transformation, aiming at unity and completeness of the divine will. Jesus Christ, dual in his nature, reinforces the concept of consubstantiality and educing the “proper existence” within the hypostatic relationship of son of God vs a man. The Holy Spirit of here functions as an expression of energy driving the whole transformation process. That monotheism of Eastern Christianity emphasized not only the diversity of ontological stances
(modes of existence) within the Holy Trinity, but drew attention to the process in itself, as opposed to the permanent, fixed personal identities, with the hypostasis of Christ’s dual nature indicating the horizon of abilities of a man. At the same time it provided a vector of reversion to unity, embodied by God in this model. This narrative model, the first level of hypostasis, according to Orthodoxy, was to facilitate the rapprochement and a key to reality of the second level which cannot be analysed through the static, colloquial conceptualisation. During communism ideology was treated in the same way. It was not about its literal “implementation,” but metaphorical and model at the same time narration instruction of the roles that need to be played in the reality of the second level. In the case of Russia, the first level was always about the movement, eluding personalistic interpretation. The foundation of Eastern religiousness was the logic of the whole and its dynamics, including structural causality, which, according to Plotinus, strives towards what is missed: the unity, and not personal, empirical, individual and static identities and interests. This period also brought the Bolshevik tendency to describe what is by what is not. It was most likely Bernard Cotiret, in his book on Calvin, who mentioned that heresy, and that is how Western Christianity perceived this impersonal conception of the Holy Trinity, similarly to Logos and History in the non-secular area, is usually a matter of grammar: do we see established identities or a process of transformation? And it was not without reason that Georges Florovsky (“La Sainte Eglise Universelle”, 1948; Florovsky, 1933; Florovsky, 1976) warned that a clash of the Orthodox Church and the personalism of Western thought can result in immobilisation of the former and suppression of its processuality. In my opinion, the situation proved to be more complex. I believe it that specific immobilization took place in Russia even before it met the Reformation and counter-reformation through Kyiv Mohyla Academy, but also as a result of movement of Western elites during the time of Peter I and Catherine the Great. It might have been caused by ceremonial traditions and rituals. And theology being replaced by ecclesiology (Kozłowski, 1988), with a well-established concept of the Church as an institution. Many of these principles were applied to the Communist Party centuries later.

Paradoxically, it can be observed that the contact that Russia established with Western theology, perceived through the concept of
Byzantine Nominalism, i.e. Gnosticism and hypostasis, has triggered new processuality of Eastern Christianity. As already mentioned, this contact allowed eduction of the concept of malleable time from Lutheranism because this is how the principle of predestination was interpreted in Russia, unlike its original understanding. Thomist realism has became a vision of a will in Russia, perceived as a phenomenon from the sphere of ontology, crucial in educing the “proper existence.” The Russian concept of a subject was not well-established, therefore the Thomistic anthropology, emphasizing the inalienable dignity of a man, was not a subject of focus. This anthropology, on the other hand, played an important role in Poland.

The contact with the West, mediated in Russia through the cognitive apparatus of the Byzantine Nominalism (hypostasis and Gnosticism), filled the Russian religiousness referring to the transformation and eduction of the “proper existence” with content. In other words it added a number of aspects that were not present to the same extent in the original Western interpretations of the same dogmata. In the case of Russia, the manner of interpretation of Western ideas was influenced not only by Eastern Christianity but also a different context: a lack of Augustinian concept of a subject and earlier rejection of the Hellenic notion of a person. This depersonalisation became a foundation of its conflict with Rome. This lack of foundation of a person for the benefit of impersonal logic of returning to unity and completeness, driven primarily by the will (energy) of the Holy Spirit and the hypostatic tension. In later secular versions, the energy was sourced by impersonal laws of history. This collectively resulted in a typical Russian humanism without a human. A good point of reference can be the concepts of Photios (Dvornik, 1948; Haugh, 1975), who attempted to mediate between the East and the West in this way, emphasising collective community, appreciated in Eastern Christianity, as an equivalent of the Augustinian individual subjectivity.

Centuries later, Russian depersonalisation under Peter I resulted in Calvin’s “rationalization”, defined as a sphere of “artificiality” created by the active entities striving to close the nominalist gap between the world of ideas and the world of actions, being interpreted in the name of rationality of control, as a construct of “service society,” comprising systemic imperative and complement of autocracy. This
The East-West Split in View of the History of Ideas

construct, systematising and **immobilising the real society** through **status boundaries and rules of activity**, was imposed from above in the name of the higher knowledge (see Gnosticism). In this way the gap between the Russian elites and the masses was closed, as they became somewhat equated by their servitude to the state. This is how the ontological gap of Western Nominalism was interpreted in Russia, both intuitively and literally. Later this principle of rationalization was re-interpreted in Russia as impersonal and objective Reason; this is how read post-Calvinist, French, Enlightenment metaphor was read in Russia, both literally and regarding Gnosticism. As a result it became a part of Gnostic hierarchy of knowledge. Consequently, it granted the right to authority and, in times of Bolshevism, opportunity to aspire to become the sole “historical subject,” thus replacing “incomplete” real subjects.

The notion of **dynamics without a subject**, typical for Russia was built on impersonal logic and systemic process of transformation in which an individual is just a pawn in a hypostatic relation. It combined implied moment of movement and increasingly realistic stasis. In theory, Western ideas could introduce the notion of a subject into Eastern Christianity and Russia. This would weaken any non-empirical notion of structural causality, impersonal logic of “transformation” and a possible occurrence of the “proper existence” only in the future. This did not take place. Thanks to the strength and actually the simplicity of the hypostasis and Gnosticism construct, the elements of Western theology and political philosophies became forced into Russia’s own perspective of processuality, providing it with only (selective) content and direction. **The future became the only real point of reference**, while the present was seen as an imperfect domain of symbols and keys to the “proper existence.” This trait of rejecting the present for the benefit of the future as the sole source of meaning, was later typical for Bolshevism.

The Lutheran notion of the existential tragedy (but also the greatness) of man, noticeable in the feedback between faith and grace, did not take in Russia even though it involved the trait of hypostatic relationship of mutual eduction and consubstantial, crucial to Orthodox Christianity. Moreover, the concept of the inalienable dignity of each specific human being got even less attention. The Russian perspective focused solely on “historical subjects” as operators of
the logics of history, as well as other subjects, which admittedly had a chance to achieve such completeness in the future, but today they must be replaced by those who have “knowledge.” Finally, there were a number of irrelevant subjects, redundant from the perspective of the logic of history, which should be eliminated.

The optics of the future “actual” existence even deformed the Leninist interpretation of Marxism in Russia. In Marxism the class conflict between capitalists and labourers perceived the hypostatic (but also Lutheran) relation of “con substantiality” gradually eliciting the extreme forms on both ends of the scope, including the exploitation of the State and awareness of the proletariat. For the optics of hypostases, implied in this concept as being crucial to Eastern Christianity, also penetrated into German Lutheranism, and, later, to Marxism. That is why, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Russia, it took on so easily; common roots in Byzantine Nominalism were almost intuitively felt. On the other hand, as in Russia, there was no tradition of a subject, and consequently no boundaries that would define specific interests, both individual and collective, replaced here by the “service society,” combined with previously formed Russian interpretation of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation notions of malleable time and the moment of will. This meant that the “genotype of revolutionariness” encouraged the Bolsheviks to take substantial shortcuts. The whole process thus became unintentionally immobilised. The substitution of the “incomplete” proletariat by the Bolshevik Party in Russia, where the party was seen as the only, albeit vicarious, “historical subject,” resulted in the creation of a helpless bureaucracy. Moreover, it was an arbitrary entity because it could eliminate any independent areas, including the market in Communism, and those were the only chance ensuring a more objective sense of decisions and actions. Terror, on the other hand, also degraded those who used it, since it disabled the movement of thought, impossible without freedom. The “Knowledge,” to which the Bolsheviks attributed Gnostic power, became a lifeless dogma. Even the Communists could notice it; the transcripts of Joseph Stalin’s speech in 1938 promoting a book about the history of the Bolshevik Party proves a good source of information on this subject.6

6 The speech of Stalin accompanying the publishing of The Short Course History of the CPSU(b), (Istoricheskiy Arhiv”, 1995, pp. 4-32). Stalin said: “To
In my publication *The Ontology of Socialism* (Staniszkis, 1992), I stated that communism gradually adopted the nature of Hegelian illusory being because it was departing from what it was originally supposed to be. But these assumptions could not be rejected because they, and they only, indicated the intra-systemic rationality. Without them, the naked power and the absurd would become clearly noticeable. A similar trap had already occurred in the past, in the tsarist formula of *autocracy*, where the tsar’s authority was unlimited, with the exception of implementation of reforms, which would lead to a reduction in his power, even if he himself considered these reforms to be necessary. Such reforms would affect the very formula of authority, which was operated only by the tsar.

4. THE BYZANTINE NOMINALISM

Byzantine Nominalism was the foundation of the paradigm of Russianness as it provided the solid, recurrent, mental tools of selection and interpretation used to deal with the borrowings from other cultural areas from the fourteenth century, through the key seventeenth century, to the present day. In order to reconstruct its rules, I need to start with the notion of *hypostatic relationship*, also referred to as ontological “consubstantiality” suggesting a processual nature of this relation. It emphasised the movement of thought and existence, when one level of narrative, or a manner of existence, triggers the other, eliciting through designated keys for understanding the signs, the energy and the will: its “proper existence.”

The other, constitutive for the Byzantine Nominalism trait, was the *Gnostic concept of hierarchy*, emphasizing a different manner of existence (and the status) of system operators, depending on the criterion of access to the “knowledge”. The knowledge here sets the standards of “*substantial truth*” and provides a formula that defines...
and explains the antinomian character of the space in which the “con-
substantiality” is realised. When opposites battle, they undergo trans-
formation through this struggle and therefore complement each other
to create a new whole.

This “substantial truth,” regarded as the “truth of existence,” ex-
presses a position consistent with the a priori provisions that defined
the target “completeness” of existence. This concept also strongly
influenced the way the issue of freedom is regarded in Orthodoxy
and supports the process of adopting of the Lutheran formula of
“freedom without free will.” Existential truth, by definition, does
not require, and is never subjected to, empirical verification, because
it can present itself and reveal its meaning only in the future, having
realised (activated and fulfilled) the hypostatic relation. The energy
driving this process derives from the impersonal Will, be it God,
Logos or History. The above structure is not greatly influenced by the
subject, as previously mentioned. The subject no longer has causa-
tive ability; it may no longer provide a cause. The exception is the
“historical subject,” due to the knowledge or its structural position,
functions as the utterer and operator of impersonal logic.

So the Byzantine Nominalism, a term coined by me, is a theo-
retical construct combining the elements of the Byzantine tradition,
including the Greek and Eastern Christian, crucial to the effective
definition of the place of Orthodoxy and Russia in the history of
ideas, vital for the selection and interpretation of Russian borrow-
ings from the West. It additionally influences the specific strategy
adopted by Russia to determine its own identity, different on the
level of symbols and the level of specific matters, with the accept-
ance of internal contradictions in an image that would disappear
once the “proper existence” had been elicited. Aristotelian differ-
ence and practical, continuous border exploration of the controlled
field, albeit through the similarity of the “transformation” rather
than theology, is not emphasised here; neither are the objections of
the actors incorporated into own fields (technique of diptych dis-
tribution) and not sameness of supported ideas. With the truth as
a matter of “authority,” as interpreted by Council of Nicaea, and with
different dynamics in the sphere of political and dogmatic contacts,
transforming along with the changes occurring in the relationship
between the secular and church authority.
And with dialectical admission of its own dramatic changes and the emergence of previously absent elements. This vision of “completeness” guided the relations between the Byzantium and Goths and Normans, and between Russia English puritans.

Finally, with typical pragmatism and flexibility in the sphere of dogma, for example, emphasising that the signs confirming faith are required primarily from those who err (Runciman, 1963, p. 87). This is because the faithful ones may take more liberties. Another example is that political cooperation is possible despite the schism, stressing that the term “common” refers to its own field of meaning and is not synonymous with “universal.”

Orthodoxy, including the unification of the liturgy in Eastern Christianity in the early fifteenth century, was treated as open politics of identity and not a dogmatic issue. Different levels of intensity were allowed here in the course of unification, depending on the assessment of the loyalty of specific church. It can be observed that the rationality of control prevailed in this circle, with simultaneous absence of discourse on theological issues. These issues were seen as symbolic and interpreted by the use of hypostasis (from Greek: the movement of thought, rather than the established system). Certain differences and contradictions were allowed on the first level and perceived as relatively independent keys to specific aspects of the second level (“proper existence”). This second level, once elicited, was expected to feature much more consistency.

The complete reconstruction of the Byzantine Nominalism in my opinion constitutes the foundation for the search of the paradigm of “Russianness.” By this I mean a recurring throughout history mechanism of selection and interpretation of borrowings, which forms an integrated entanglement of views built on radically different input materials as the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, religious ideas and Marxist historical materialism. Additionally, this notion includes a characteristic manner of constructing own identity and relation with the outside world, recurring in series of historical events, both before and after communism.

---

The Byzantine Nominalism is primarily Gnosticism and hypostasis, understood as a learning tool, but also as the foundation of a dynamic, hypostatic relationship of “consubstantiality.” The knowledge here is seen as a source of legitimisation to become a “subject of history” and a literal directive for an action.

I decided to use the term “nominalism” as my natural point of reference is Western Nominalism, with its two-level ontology (the world of ideas and the world of matters) and the struggle to establish correspondence between them respecting the relative autonomy of both of these levels. The role of the element establishing this correspondence needs to be emphasised here; with the understanding that this process also facilitates its own growth. This type of nominalism never reached Russia. Therefore, the trap involving forcing the patristic and Byzantine authors, as well as concepts used in Eastern Christianity to be read through Western narrative, described by the aforementioned Georges Florovsky, needs to be avoided. I aim to present a reverse situation, when Russia selected from Western ideas and strengthened these notions that were close to Eastern narrative. As a result, these ideas become interpreted in a completely different manner than where they originated. This refers to both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, where the doctrine of predestination was understood as a key to the knowledge about the malleability of time; in Thomism the moment of will was interpreted as the tool for eliciting the “proper existence.” It also covers Marxism in its Leninist interpretation; more on this subject in dispute with Plekhanov.

The Byzantine Nominalism, occurring in Eastern Christianity between the fourth and fourteenth century and constituting the basis for the sustainable and characteristically Russian mechanism of selection and interpretation of Western borrowings, needs to be analysed on two levels: the elite and plebeian.

The first involves the aforementioned elements, including the epistemology of hypostasis (the first level functioning as the cognitive key to the second), ontology referring to the hypostatic relations (duality, in which individual elements create each other, eliciting the complete “proper existence” from each other), and Gnosticism (knowledge qualifying to authority and plan of action).

For the plebeian level, on the other hand, the quasi-magical narrative of theurgy seems to be typical. It refers to the Chaldean Oracles
and is generally seen as simplistic archetype of the logic of history and a magical mechanism of transformation at the same time. Eric R. Dodds (Dodds, 2002, p. 228) emphasizes, after Proclus, that theurgy is a power recognized as greater than the entire human reason. And, most likely correctly, he adds that this move toward irrationality in Eastern Christianity is the “last resort of desperate, who have been failed by both the people and God, making theurgy a refuge for the hopeless intelligence which has already experienced la fascination de l’abîme.” It’s not so much about the Neoplatonists in general, but only those Neoplatonists occupying low ranks of the institution of the church and, due to their impatience and lack of education, count on illumination and a blessing rather than expect a tedious process based on rational analysis. Nota bene, these two versions and the oscillation between them occur in both Islam and Augustinism.

At the same time some shared issues for both versions (elite and mass) can be identified. It is, above all, in both versions, the theurgy and the disciplined hypostatic method, the fact that they contain apparent contradictions, a fact typical for Byzantine synthesis (Dodds, 2002). Each element, symbol or sign, is in fact perceived as a unique key to various aspects of existence and their representation which need to be elicited, in accordance with the epistemology of hypostasis. Alternatively, they may be created in the future. Current relations between the aspects of the first narrative level are therefore less important than the future coherence of the elements of existence elicited by this narrative, as they will occur in the future. This is indicated by the early Christian interpretation, in which the movement of the elements “can be fully itself” only if it strives to reach the defined a priori “proper goal,” i.e., their “truth of existence,” manifesting itself in the future and elusive today, impossible to be empirically verified. On the other hand, it is evidenced in the contemporary interpretation of Florovsky’s two types of dynamics. Another indication is the notion of two types of time, the “important” (referring to the mode of eternity) and the “accidental.” In Bolshevism this classification was used for the division of beings (subjects); hence the “historical” ones, with their place and role provided for in the logic of historical materialism and the “irrelevant” ones, not reflecting this logic. This is accompanied by a characteristic (and again reproduced in Bolshevism) approach to differences. It is assumed that, after Origen,
unity is a natural state. Unity understood as the hypostatic union, in which one element facilitates the eduction and completion of the other, hidden deeper. A chaotic “diversity” and its awareness occur after the fall (ancestral sin).

In both versions, the future is the only point of reference for the evaluation of the present. This type of evaluation and legitimation, referring to the a priori (assumed) vision of the future, and not to the actual, empirical events, proved to be typical of Bolshevism, also its post- or even anti-communist version.

It is similar to the aforementioned varied approach to the actors when, according to theory, they do not participate in the implementation of the logic of history, as it is History that replaced the Origen’s Absolute, with reaching ontological conclusions (substantial or superfluous, complete or incomplete entity). This “knowledge” became the source of political motions, for example attempts to “complete” and force “transformation” by the use of a staged conflict as a catalyst. And, should this approach not bring results, substitution of the subjects deemed “incomplete” or even their elimination. Unity, consistency in the future existence and ridding of the contradictions accepted on the first level of the original narrative was believed to be the outcome of that process, legitimised by a priori knowledge.

Maximus the Confessor,\(^8\) John of Damascus,\(^9\) but also Athanasius emphasising the key for this process the moment of will, are key names contributing to understanding of the formation and dynamics of the Byzantine Nominalism. Others include the Neoplatonists

---

\(^8\) Died in 662 A.D., creator of theology of “participation” and Eastern Christian interpretation of the Council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.) Strongly influenced by Christology of Evagrius of Pontus declaring that Jesus is the “intellect” hypostatically united with the Logos, he argued with Origen, for whom diversity and movement came from the fall. Maximus, on the contrary, believed processuality and hypostasis to be fundamental characteristic of any works of nature, with their individual energy. This energy (will) in h mans is aimed at achieving the union with God; he treated it as true freedom. It is a hypostatic unity allowing – in the process of deification – the man to keep their human nature. He studied hypostatic nature of Christ (Meyendorff, 1984, p. 206; Uspienskiy, 1891).

\(^9\) The main tractate *De fide ortodoxa*, is used as a theology textbook in Eastern Christianity.
like Proclus and Plotinus, formulating the foundations of theurgy as a common, ritualised reference to a hypostatic relation.

I would like to present now a more detailed explanation of the concepts of hypostasis, key in the Byzantine Nominalism. It is firstly a synonym for a cognitive strategy where the first level provides a set of tools required for the second level. It is also a manner of existence, referring to the antinomy and trivalent logic, (see the Cappadocian Fathers). As for the tension in the hypostatic relationship, triggering the transformation and eliciting the “proper existence” from themselves and each other. Monotheism in Eastern Christianity, referring to the dual nature of Christ, seen as both the Son of God and a man, is a crucial term for understanding the hypostatic relationship. Here each of the parties develops thanks to the other, together with the moment of will and a common goal they both serve functioning as a source of energy enabling this transformation. All this can take place in both the spheres of thought and reality. This duality of Byzantine Nominalism (cognitive strategy and processual, dynamic manner of existence) is fundamentally different to the duality of his Western Nominalism with its Sisyphean drive to seek correspondence between the levels. The exploration is here carried out by the subject, be it individual or collective, which is formed by this very process. Contrary, the Byzantine Nominalism, with its process without actors, involves structural causality, where the conflict is seen as a catalyst for change, as well as the energy of awareness of the priori goal and the will (mystical “historical subject” being the carrier of both). A real subject, a man, is technically non-existent. The concept of the basic pillars of faith is similarly non-personalistic. The Holy Trinity is, according to the Cappadocian fathers, a construct comprising of three hypostases in one entity, where each of the elements has dual nature and undergoes transformation. Their mutual relationship becomes a source of energy, focused by their common goal. This evidently non-Hellenic interpretation of existence clearly goes beyond the canon of Platonism, with its incorporation of ideas, and Aristotelianism, with its unequivocal identities and the category of “difference” which is of no use in the cognitive strategies of hypostasis.

What distinguishes these two types of nominalism, is not a system of values, but ontology or, in other words, what is considered to be “real,” with the processual approach in the Byzantine version.
The other difference is the role of the subject: absent or mystical in Byzantine Nominalism, replacing the real entity by the historic one, perceived in the perspective of a priori assumptions. In the current space, the empirical existence requires transformation and completion with the use of “will” and “knowledge” and the dynamics imposed by those, who possess the “knowledge” and are familiar with the “goal.”

In the West, a clear, post-Augustinian subject is defined in Lutheran and Calvinist way within the canon of “freedom without free will,” prevalence of the whole over the components and justification by faith but, coincidentally, it creates the world. In its extreme interpretation it is said that it is the subject who creates God, due to the paradoxical feedback between grace and faith, with the recognition that “reality” is that material fact and the movement of thought caused by this very fact. This is the subject which should, according to the Reformation, acknowledge its futility, but at the same time it is capable of “rationalization;” within the search for the tension-reducing “correspondence” of Western Nominalism. This contrasts with the structural prevalence and ambivalence of the weak or even non-existent as a real force, notion of a subject in the Byzantine Nominalism. It is supposed to occur only in the future, when the impersonal forces: God with its freedom (but also a compulsion), the absolute goal or history, will elicit the “proper existence”, within the relationship of consubstantiality. It is the logic of history, will and the energy of hypostatic relation as well as the direction and goal determined by the knowledge perceived in the Gnostic perspective that elicit the subject in the Byzantine Nominalism, and not the Augustinian, intellectual self-creation, self-awareness and the strive to observe one’s own thought process.

5. THE PARADIGM OF RUSSIANNESST: DECONSTRUCTION

The paradigm of Russianness, a continuation of the aforementioned Byzantine Nominalism, including the use of its perspective to interpret the borrowings from the West, comprises, in my opinion, four characteristics:
1) **The genotype of revolutionariness** as a result of the sixteenth and seventeenth century borrowing from the West in Russia, including the Reformation and the Thomistic Counter-Reformation, filtered through the perspective of hypostasis and Gnosticism. Its superficiality, not allowing for the perception of the differences but, on the other hand, the use of the same mental filter on the two combatant notions (treated in Russia as an antinomy and not contradiction), resulted in the creation of a consistent nod despite the original, fundamental differences. The absorption of these borrowings was facilitated by the intuitive understanding of the influence of Byzantium and Eastern Christianity in Russia, both in the Reformation, and in Thomism.

With the **doctrine of predestination**, originally regarding the lack of causal relationships between deeds and salvation, in Russia that was read as a hypostatic key to a deeper knowledge. It lead to the emergence of the vision of the lack of causal relationships over time, probably contrary to the intentions of Western interpreters of this doctrine. Additionally, it resulted in the thesis of its full malleability.

The **Thomist themes** in the Counter-Reformation, transferred from the Mohyla Academy and the Jesuit “new Thomism” brought to Russian thought as moment of will as a factor triggering the metabolism and eliciting the “proper existence.”

It is this **ontologisation of the will and depersonalization** of the forces driving the transformation that even earlier constituted the axis differentiating Eastern and Western Christianity (dispute regarding the Holy Trinity). The Russian interpretation of borrowings from the West only refreshed, reinforced and strengthened this attitude. **What was noticed and transferred onto Russian soil was mostly what intuitively felt familiar.** But as early as in the eleventh century, in the dispute on *Filioque* and the ontological status of the Holy Trinity, in Eastern Christianity the personalized Western vision was rejected and it was stated that the answer was a **hypostasis of hypostases**. In other words, a construct presenting hypostatic tension between the elements, two of which (Christ and God) have their own dual, hypostatic nature. Holy Spirit was understood as the energy triggering the consubstantiality of the dual nature of Christ. As for God, seen as the absolute Logos, his role was to determine the cause and the goal (hypostatic unity), direction and the meaning of this transformation. **Hypostasis therefore relates to the duality of each of**
the elements: will and energy, the son of God and a man, freedom and compulsion. On the other hand, it focuses on the relationship between them, aiming at completeness and unity, through tension and transformation. In secular versions the mystical Logos of History became the same focus of the dynamics, with a similar depersonalisation. The metaphorical character of this concept in German post-Lutheran, political philosophies, including the works of Hegel, Marx and the Romantics, in Russia, with its literal, “realistic” interpretation, became transformed into the instruction for revolution.

First in the eighteenth-century and later, especially in the times of Alexander II, Russian incitement to approach the idea with a pinch of salt, in a pietistic manner, as it was primarily used in the reform-blocking idea of autocracy, did not become popular. It was because Russia lacked Augustinism, with its subject observing and controlling its own thought process. On the contrary, there was a post-Platonic, indivisible idea, and then – gnostic knowledge with a similar status, independent of a man.

The believe of the malleability of time, with the “reverse” and “fast forward” options, as well as the energy flowing from the will (in its relation with the “knowledge”), constitute the key elements of the Russian “genotype of revolutionariness.” As can be clearly seen, the gnostic formula of “knowledge,” providing authority, is of the highest importance. Another important element is the opportunity to function as a substitute of subjects which have not achieved their completeness through failure to undergo transformation to “historical subjects.” This intense rationalization of their own role until the end was presented by the Communist Party. The two parallel orders can be observed here: real transformation and gaining self-knowledge through conflict (which for the Communists was just a state of hypostatic consubstantiality) and experiencing all this in the realm of the a priori theory of history. The main actors can be replaced when their transformation and completeness have not been achieved by those functioning in the background.

The second feature of the paradigm, adding to the aforementioned “genotype revolutionariness,” is the relativism of evaluation, inevitable in this approach to empiricism. It is because the deeds are evaluated on the basis of their future (assumed a priori) effects, as opposed to those that are observable at present. The impact of
The epistemology of hypostasis can be noticed again, with the emphasis on its transformation and future “actual” existence of which has yet to be “elicited,” and exclusive Gnostic right to decide what is “real” and what is “rational.” The right, let us add, coming from the assumed place at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge. Because their a priori assumption are key here, and not current knowledge, referring to the current, empirical verification.

These very elements of Byzantine Nominalism resulted in the palpable similarity between Russia’s own tradition and the Lutheran principle of “justification by faith.” However, in Russia, this intellectual metaphor evolved into an assumed rejection of “the present” in favour of “the future.” And, specific to the epistemological hypostasis rejection of empirical verification, resonating with the formula “the truth of existence” (compliance with the a priori assumptions).

Thirdly, therefore, within a paradigm Russianness the categorising of the “historical”, “real” “redundant” actors can be observed. The first group knowingly participates in the logic of history and historical relations of consubstantiality, or has adequate knowledge of these dynamics, which allows them to simulate and engineer appropriate operations. The “real” actors partake in this logic, but lacking self-knowledge. The last group, “redundant,” contains all the actors that are deemed irrelevant from the perspective of that logic, they fail to influence it in any way.

This post-Hegelian classification also applied to people in Russia and not only the sphere of thought, in communism constituted political rationalization of the role of the party and the directive deciding who can (and should) be eliminated from society.

The remnants of this approach can be seen in the debate, constitutive for the Bolshevik Party, regarding the “majority” in the 1917 revolution. The Bolsheviks believed that the workers, who, although empirically constituted a minority in this de facto peasant revolution, should be regarded as “the majority” because of their, a priori assumed role in history. And later, following the disappointment of the anti-Bolshevik Kronstadt rebellion, it was decided that the party must replace the “incomplete” subject, because the workers failed to be seen as “proletariat” (VI Congress of 1921). Because, it was argued, the revolutionary elimination of the Russian capitalists, and thus the conflict which was supposed to trigger transformation,
shattered the hope educating the potential “proper existence” of the working class. The above notion seemingly corresponded with the Marxist concept of “class in itself” and “class for itself.” In Russia, however, extreme political conclusions were drawn, identifying “the dictatorship of the (non-existent) proletariat” with the dictatorship of the party, functioning as a substitute for the latter. Marxism had its roots in the Lutheran concept of existence as a combination of the realm of facts and realm of the movement of thought, causing these observable facts. But, in Russia, these elements of the theory became the directives for political operations, evaluation and systematisation of actors performing in the social scene, bypassing their current empirical motives and interests.

The last, fourth element of the paradigm of Russianness is a unique attitude to time, resulting from translation of the doctrine of predetermination into the language of hypostasis and Gnosticism, with the conviction that history can be fast-forwarded, or certain phases can be omitted. The only requirement is knowledge of the laws of historical development. This is sufficient to replace the undeveloped mechanisms and actors (see discussion between Lenin and Plekhanov). It was facilitated by, in my opinion, the key role was played here by the Russian’s weakness towards a subjective approach, resulting from the rejection of Hellenic personalisation in Eastern Christianity. Additional factors included: a lack of Augustinism tradition in Russia, where the subject was shaped by observation of its own thought process; Western Nominalism with its evolutionary establishing of the correspondence between the realm of ideas and the realm of actions and the emergence of social subjects in the course of this process. This is why Calvin, post-nominalist, “rationalization,” defined as the process of constructing an artificial human realm, institutions and positive law, aimed at closing the nominalist gap, was replaced in Russia by an impersonal conception of Reason. And later, within dogma in Russia of historical materialism, the laws of history.

The fact that a strong influence of Lutheranism in Russia, resulting from an intuitive recognition of common roots in the Byzantine Nominalism, constituted the key to understanding the process of rotation

---

10 Arguments provided here by P.N. Tkachov (“Sobrannije sochinenija”, 1933, Vol. 4), who suggested that stages of development can be omitted.
of ideas between Germany and Russia, between the Reformation and the Orthodox church, and later the penetration of the Russian intelligentsia by secular political philosophies of Hegel and Marx, though, unsurprisingly, not Kant with his individual subjective Augustinian “assumptiveness”. The Lutheran relationship of mutually evoking faith and grace corresponds with the hypostatic relationship of consubstantiality. Luther’s concept of freedom without free will, identical to the Eastern “existential truth,” reminds ontologisation of freedom in the Eastern Christian Gregory of Nyssa, who claimed that freedom is the achievement of the situation in harmony with nature. The remnants of St. Paul’s *Letter to the Romans* can be identified here as well. He stated that freedom is good only for people, meaning those who have reached the completeness of existence, the Eastern “hypostatic unity.” St. Paul mentioned the Lutheran notion of “justification by faith.” Eastern Christianity tightened the position of the superiority of grace over the convent (the law). These same notions in the West were received differently, as the Hellenistic and Augustinian subject had been well-established the Gnosticism and Arianism had been rejected. These relations between Lutheranism with Eastern Christianity (the Byzantine Nominalism), however, were intuitively picked on in Russia. This has increased its sensitivity and readiness to borrow from the West even more, also from secular philosophies that were in numerous aspects an expression of a secularised continuity with the Reformation. Although, as emphasised, the Russians themselves had not experienced the process of secularisation, when the secular philosophies continued the Reformation (for example in Germany), albeit without the notion of the Absolute, or with its substitution, for example by Logos or History. Sustained mechanism of selection and interpretation of Western ideas through the Eastern Christianity Gnosticism, typical for Russia, first resulted in deformation of the ideas stemming from Lutheranism and Calvinism, acquired in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also Thomism. Later, in the nineteenth century, it led to an independent, literal (functioning as a political program) interpretation of the German secular political philosophies. A lack of experience resulted in secularisation which meant that religious metaphors were treated in Russia as operating instructions, hence the manner in which Peter I and Catherine the Great transformed the Calvinist notion of “rationalization” into the
formula of “service society” and “public service,” imposed by the authority. Marxist laws of history, consequently, were understood as a quasi-religious order to manipulate time; Lenin’s concept of omitting certain stages of development, following the interpretation of the doctrine of predestination as a narrative regarding the malleability of time.

What is striking in Russian thought is the continuity of manifestation of both a lack of experience of the subject and the autonomous form. Hence the nineteenth century comments made by Khomyakov on the “unity and liberty,” with the meaning of the “truth of existence,” and the “rejection of the spirit juridism.” Other examples include the statements made by P. Florensky in the nineteenth century on the concept that the Church expresses two truths, remaining with each other in hypostasis and antinomy: the nature of community, “unity” and, on the other hand, “apostolic” nature based on the hierarchy of knowledge. What is emphasised here is that the universality of the church is a consequence of the universality of sin. All these statements supported the establishment of the foundations of the Bolshevik Party, as well as its rationalization. The discussion on the relationship between “plurality, unity and wholeness” supporting the “pillar of truth” were transferred onto the notion of the Communist International. What shaped the community here was not an identical programme and functioning but, similar direction of change, combined with a reaction to the same, real issues.

6. THE REVOLUTIONARY PRAGMATISM

The revolutionary pragmatism is accompanied by another feature, typical for the paradigm Russianness, and present at the times of Eastern Christianity. It is a striking pragmatism. In the political dimension is affected (and still affects) the unique Russian concept of own imperiality.

In this perspective identity was built by comparing possible potential and the “actual” existences and directions of development, as opposed to real beings. I. Danilevsky (“The Russian Idea”, 1935, pp. 113-115), Russian nineteenth-century philosopher of history, defined the situation in Russia as functioning within the framework of a higher
**kind of development**, however currently at a level lower than the West, regarding tangible results. A part of this reasoning is also to emphasise that various aspects of the system are characterised by varying degrees of advancement towards the assumed a priori “proper” existence. This reasoning allowed for a little use of Aristotelian logic, with its clearly defined difference. More appropriate and more applicable in Russia, was the perspective of antinomy in which the nominal opposites while fighting with each other, elicit each other’s hidden essence; evil here sometimes has its own function because, triggering the conflict, it facilitates future good. An individual state was considered unique and incomparable. In this approach the duality of each element is accepted, with different dynamics and the degree of advancement towards the “actual” existence, be it on the symbolic level or the realm of tangible processes. The clearer the distinction is the real sphere, the higher the expectation of greater, symbolically expressed, subordination And, paradoxically, allowing for greater symbolic freedom, when the actual dependence is greater in the real sphere or at least in the noticeable movement on the same axis of development. In Russia, self-transition was also allowed (even though it could have meant becoming the current opponent) because the superficial differences were interpreted only as a set of keys used for bringing out “proper existence” in the future. It was believed that the sameness is determined mainly by a common focus, direction of changes, despite current differences. This can be seen in the dispute conducted during the communist era on the managerial revolution occurring, with varying degrees, in the USSR, and the USA (Burnham, 1958).

Therefore, already in Eastern Christianity, the use the language of an opponent while partaking in any disputes was suggested. It was believed that inconsistency and a lack of logic in the discourse on the first level of hypostasis narrative is normal, as it is used purely for getting to the bottom of things. And it was the second level, which expressed the “unity,” thus requiring consistency. Clearly there are various concepts of rationality here: rationality at the first level was instrumental but at the second level it was determined by the “truth of existence” and the a priori knowledge, not referring to empiricism, to what actually is.

In the case of the empire, it is accompanied by constant testing of loyalty and the limits of own field. For that reason, the diptychs
technique was used, known since Byzantine times. What that meant in practice was periodically informing the centres of power and influence within the empire and outside of it (Staniszkis, 2001) on Russia’s position on current key issues. They did not require unanimity: a lack of open opposition was sufficient.

As evident, only the history of ideas can meet the challenge that I took upon, provide efficient explanation of the differences in mentality and beliefs, including the concept of authority and order in Western and Eastern Europe. The element of the distorting mirror seemed to be of great importance, when the ideas taken out of context in which they were created, in the new context gained a new meaning, for example Lutheranism and Calvinism born in the West, on the foundation of Augustinism and Western Nominalism, emphasizing the autonomy of the form and subjectivity. And to make things even more confusing, these ideas were intuitively accepted in Russia and adopted as her own, because it was Lutheranism and even more Orthodoxy that had borrowed in the past from the same source of the Byzantine Nominalism the epistemology of hypostasis with its emphasis on “consubstantiality.”

7. SECULARISATION: A DIFFERENT COURSE IN THE WEST AND IN RUSSIA

As proven above, in this paper I am focussing on the rotation of religious ideas and the modification of their meaning, depending on the context of civilization and past experiences in the realm of thought. Secularization was perceived here as a continuity, because it usually continued ontological assumptions (defining what is “real”), typical for the specific religious circle, as well as anthropology specifying the place and role of a man, including the Russian humanism without a subject, and epistemology. In Russia this last dimension proved to be crucial, because it determined the contents of the other dimensions, including specific ontology and anthropology. This was the case due to Gnosticism and the perspective of hypostasis, with its relation of consubstantiality. It can even be stated that in Russia this continuity existed at the meta-level, because the notion of the analysis of reality through hypostasis and Gnosticism recurred in various
moments of Russian history. But, paradoxically, continuity on the level of specific content is more noticeable in the West, despite the gradual elimination of the category of the Absolute. Secularization there was a deliberate process of reinterpretation.

In the case of Russia, the situation was much more complex. Continuity refers to the filter through which the borrowings were interpreted. But at the same time each was treated separately. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century it took place over the topics associated with the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation; in the nineteenth and twentieth century it regarded the acquisition of secular philosophies, mainly German (Romanticism, Hegel, Marx), but without the intellectual experience (for example in Germany) of the continuity of the latter and previously standing Lutheranism. Russia itself did not experience mental secularisation of religious ideas and their transformation into laic. Only the tool of interpretation of those borrowings underwent the process of secularisation, with the transition from Eastern Christianity into Leninism.

Because, although in Germany the continuity between religious ideas and their secular successors was somewhat organic, it was the secular philosophies that caused the extremes of previous religious assumptions, or, even when these assumptions were rejected, they continued the perception of what was “real.” A subsequent, post-secularisation, reversing to the main themes of religious tradition, though on the Kant’s principle of assumptiveness, without the category of the Absolute, even strengthened the sense of continuity but with the but change of meaning.

But this sequence was interrupted in Russia. It occurred because the products of the different stages of the Western history of ideas were adopted in an automatic manner, in isolation from their intellectual roots. Hence the easily observed Russian tendency to use the religion instrumentally use to dogmatise secular ideas.

So the Lutheran ontology, which perceived any event with an accompanying movement of thought as a “fact,” was translated in Russia into the transformation from “being in itself” to “being for itself,” with the will, conflict and power as tools used to elicit the “proper existence”. This way they served, through knowledge, to the logic of the Logos and History. But the secular, Hegelian interpretation (idealism without the subject), with its impersonal movement of
ideas but not thoughts, which constituted the dialectical development and Augustinism and Lutheranism, was not accepted in Russia in this perspective. Taken out of this context, however, it becomes included in Russia and Poland (messianism) in the diagnosis of its own position: the country which had not yet participated in a creative movement of ideas must champion in the future, in compliance with the thesis and antithesis rule. Also, Nietzsche’s analyses of the tragedy of a man who cannot meet the challenge contained in the hypostasis of the dual nature of Christ (the son of God – a man) in Russia were understood in a magical way. This perception made space for hope for a transformation obtained through the participation in rituals.

As presented by the aforementioned Ken Jowitt (“Research Series”, Institute of International Studies, No. 37, 1978), this thread was used by the Bolsheviks, promising the solution to individual dilemmas by the shift to class identity. In the West the same motif of tragedy resulted in a postulate that a man should strive to see their limitations creatively, establishing institutions and law, and thus defining their own boundaries. It can be observed that the context of form consciousness and strong subjectivity in the end led the West to a different answer to this same dilemma than in Russia. In the West this evolution had radical points, including the theology of act, with paroxysms of secularisation and a post-secular (without God) reversal of religious ideas, including German, theological concepts, emphasizing the ethics of responsibility. In Russia, such dramatic vicissitudes did not come about. Most significant ones involved helpless, pietistic attempts to leave literalism and tragedy behind, and ritualization on a mass scale, translating the dilemmas of theology onto the liturgy and ecclesiology. It was similar with the communist ideology, where the persecuted revisionists attempted to force a return to the original assumptions and literalness, despite the approach of the bureaucratic apparatus.

The primary elements of the paradigm of Russianness included will but not law, the belief in transformation, anti-empiricism, the future as a source of meaning and justification of the present, humanism without an individual. All of them occurred in the thought of both the supporters and the opponents of the revolution (Berdyaev, 1923; Berdyaev, 1972; “V poiskah puti”, 1992; Lossky, 1941; Shestov, 1971; Fedotov, 1985; “Russian Thought after Communism”, 1994).
8. FURTHER RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

There are five hypotheses, arising from aforementioned material; they all require further verification on Russian soil, which at the moment exceeds the capabilities of this analysis and my knowledge.

Specific elements and the sequence of these hypotheses is also hypothetical and constitutes a contribution to the wider philosophical model, as part of the history of ideas. That model is the result of re-reading of known publications, also originally from the era subject in these discussions. Theoretical intuition and imagination of the author is also apparent, referring to the hidden and not fully conscious knowledge accumulated over decades of scientific work. With this vast experience it is sometimes challenging to identify specific sources. The proposed research model may be humbly seen as a set of questions which need to be answered in order to gain a full understanding of what Russia is.

The verification of the hypotheses in this publication is therefore only rudimentary, initial and insufficient. I see them as a task and a challenge, or maybe a signpost, for future generations of researchers.

Here is a list of those hypotheses (research questions):

First, that the continuity of the “paradigm of Russianness,” originally formed between the fourteenth and eighteenth century, regards more the meta-level than the continuity of the specific content. This includes the mechanism of selection and interpretation of borrowings from the West, still occurring in Russia, involves almost intuitive but sometimes overvalued ability to sense the similarities present due to the influence of the West on Eastern Christianity. A deficit of theology and philosophy, typical for Russia, led to exposure to ideas and theories, often contradictory, which have been created in other circles of civilization and intellectual context. They were then deformed in Russia in a systematic way, as a result of the perspective of Gnosticism and hypostasis, used for their interpretation. And, crucially, their transfer into the context of Russian and Central and Eastern European reality, devoid of mental experience Augustinism with its construct of self-observing subject. On the contrary, previous trends in Eastern Christianity, in order to rid itself of Hellenistic personalism and replace it with a kind of structural causality (involving the relation of consubstantial and conflict) as well as will subjected to
ontology and understood as an aspect of existence, lead to eradication of the notion of the individual person out of Eastern interpretation of the Western trends.

Secondly, that the solid foundation of this mechanism of selection and interpretation, as well as its systematic deformations, is a construct that I refer to as the Byzantine Nominalism. This construct continues and codifies the perspective of Gnosticism and a cognitive strategy (as well as ontology) of hypostasis. Byzantine Nominalism indisputably competed with its Western version. Byzantine Nominalism treated the first level of narrative as the key to the second, and the tensions of the dual nature of existences and between them were recognized as a mechanism to elicit their proper existence. The Western Nominalism, recognizing the relative autonomy of the realm of words and substantial facts, with their individual unique logic, commanded the Sisyphean, almost certainly ineffectual, effort to strive and establish correspondence between them. This process was seen as an opportunity to consolidate these subjects.

Thirdly, the notion that one of the key differences between the two types of nominalism was the dissimilar manner in which they rejected Platonism. In the West it took place along the discovery of autonomy of a form; in the East, on the other hand, with processuality and the rejection of “being” in favour of “becoming.”

Fourthly, that crucial difference between these two civilisations, including Russia’s unique way of interpreting Lutheranism, Calvinism, Thomism, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, is a unique ontology (what is perceived as “real”) and the issue of the subject.

While in the Western Nominalism, the search for correspondence activated and shaped the existing subjects, both individual and collective, in the Byzantine Nominalism the “proper existence” had to be “elicited,” thanks to will, sign reading and logic of history, with the conflict as a catalyst and, paradoxically, a form of unconscious cooperation between the parties in this formative effort. And should this process prove to be impossible, those subjects should be replaced. And the avangarde, that substitute historical subject, were those who had “knowledge,” in compliance with Gnosticism. This theme was strongly observed during the communist era, where the workers who failed to become a “proletariat” were to be replaced in the role of
“subject of history” by the political party, as it had the understanding of the laws of materialism. This required certain rituals within the party, modelled on the Orthodox ecclesiology, as they were meant to form a depicting narrative, the notion of transformation and the substitution.

Fifthly, that in both the Western and Eastern Europe, secularisation continued, but differently in each cultural circle, its basic provisions, unique and specific, originally constituting a part of religious systems. Marxism was the extension of Lutheranism; the ideas of class “in itself” and class “for itself” as a transposition of the Lutheran fact as substantial event and the movement of thought that triggered this event. In the Enlightenment, the concept of “Reason” was in fact a deformed continuation of the Calvinist rationalization. Bolshevism, also in its non-Communist version, including the right-wing, may be perceived as a continuation of the Russian interpretation of the doctrine of predestination, understood as a hypostatic message regarding time malleability and seeing Thomism as the ontology of will leading to elicitation of the “proper existence.” This “genotype of revolutionariness,” following the transformation of the contradictory Western systems of thought by the same interpretative key, accompanied Russia since the seventeenth century. It was then reinforced by the theses of substitution of real beings who failed to undergo the transformation and become historical subjects and the anti-empiricism of legitimisation of the operations of authority in the perspective of what is to take place in the future, in accordance with the a priori knowledge, but not what actually is. This mentality formed both Leninism and the “real socialism.” Communism in decline, with its elements of top-down revolution in the name of de-totalisation which was originally meant to secure more control of the communist government, but not lead to a fundamental, systemic change, in this perspective can be read through the optics of paradox: less power as a greater control. This optics was used to compensate and reverse the effects of Hegelian illusory being when the real communism, combined with reference to will and time manipulation, turned out to be something different than originally believed, but these assumptions could not be rejected as they constituted the only foundation for the internal rationality of the system. The Gdansk agreements in August 1980 supplemented the system based on the leading role
of the Communist Party as a substitute for non-complete historical “proletariat,” with the Solidarity, representing that real, although incomplete, subject; the workers’ class. This supplementation and the negotiation between these two was to modify this dysfunctional ideology of “illusory being.” But, paradoxically, it was supposed to be done with the help of the reasoning and concepts understandable only when he uses his tongue, shaped by Gnosticism and hypostasis of “consubstantiality” and transformation.

This continuity in the transformation, and lack of comprehension of the whole process by the workers as they operated within different optics of dignity, status and the community, in the eyes of the members of the lower party apparatus, was supposed to camouflage the revolutionariness of this step. It was additionally hidden by forcing Solidarity to include in their statute that they “recognised the leading role of the party in the state.” The formal compromise of the Communists was removal of the phrase “… and in society.”

This manoeuvre of the profound change still complied with the Bolshevik discourse, (as well as also as an alibi of the communist elite in its relations with Moscow. Similarly to the speech by M.F. Rakowski, announcing the dissolution of the Communist Party in 1991, when, in turn, the emphasis was put on the “premature” introduction of the communism in Poland which then still lacked class-conscious proletariat, and bureaucratisation of its substitute (the Party). The hope was also expressed that the introduction of capitalism in Poland after 1989, in the formula of political capitalism, when the communist apparatus underwent affranchisement, would trigger the conflict and result in historic transformation of the workers. This would, in turn, allow for the communist project to be re-launched.

This logic confirms the existence of the formula of malleable, reversible time, will and transformation, with hypostatic relationship of consubstantiality and Gnostic knowledge, defining the substance of the “proper existence,” in the background. Today this perspective is still held by the right-wing, still mentally “Bolshevik” approach of PiS (Polish political party Law and Justice). Here the emphasis is put on the moment of will opposing the law and conflict as a catalyst for the extraction of the “real existence.”

In Bolshevism is was the Russian ecclesiology (doctrine of the church) that had become a source of social engineering suggestions
and rationalization for the communists. The belief in the transformation through the sacraments in communism was accompanied by ritualization. The argument that the universality of the church is caused by the universality of sin is almost identical as the rationalization of the Communist Internationals and the Comintern. The anti-subject approach of Eastern Christianity was greatly used, with its encouragement that in order to be closer to God one has to renounce oneself. Florovsky insisted that the truth comes not from discourse or experience, but from “the truth of existence.” In Bolshevik rhetoric this statement only changed in form, but not in the content of the narrative. The expectancy of the “transformation” resulted in the focus being moved from the present to the future, hindering empirical verification of the sense of operations. That striking continuity shows that permanent differences in civilization stem from the schism of Europe along the axis of Western and Eastern Christianity. This also takes into account the concept of authority and order, the role of law and institutions, and the strength or weakness of the subject.

POSTSCRIPT

This attempt to reconstruct the “paradigm of Russianness” reminded me of three conversations I had with members of the communist apparatus during the communist regime. Today, in the light of what I do, I interpret them in a completely different way. Back then I was just embarrassed because I was not familiar with this environment and I now understand what was said. I did not understand the syndrome of “Bolshevism” as an attitude, functioning in Russia, even before the commencement of communism and afterwards. My interlocutors were all members (or ex-members) of the Communist Party, although not revisionists, but neither solely interested in the authority, especially as it was questionable in communism as did not provide any real control. They all considered the dilemmas of establishing communism in the country, which historically had not experienced strong capitalism. A priori logic of history, and not empiricism, will but not law, substitution of the “incomplete” real subjects by the structural causality and conflict as a mechanism for
eliciting identity... All these elements of the “paradigm of Russian-ness” were touched upon in those conversations.

My first interlocutor was Władysław Matwin, who was the young secretary of the Central Committee in October 1956, expelled in the mid-70s from the Party and, following his graduation and obtaining his diploma in Mathematics, he worked at the Institute for Systems Research where I was also employed. He formulated the thesis that the main problem of Poland is that reformation was not successful. Back then I did not ask what he meant: the lack of the Protestant ethic, or, on the contrary, the lack of the “genotype of revolutionariness” in Poland; these terms have been reconstructed above in the Russian interpretation of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, the Jesuits’ “new Thomism,” creating a consistent nod of malleable time and will.

The second interlocutor, Mieczysław Krajewski, was head of the department of ideology in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Autumn 1981). He later worked in the faction opposing the introduction of martial law and before, seeking contacts with the Solidarity “Network” in which I was also involved, for example in matters of property rights. Krajewski, as it seems, hoped that maybe the workers of the “Network,” interested in self-government, would prove to be “the real proletariat”. It would end the substitution of a non-existent proletariat by the bureaucracy of the Party, and forced liquidation of Solidarity will not be needed. More about the discussions I had at the time with the members of the Communist Party I wrote in my book The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe (Staniszkis, 1991).

The third conversation, with Mieczysław F. Rakowski also took place also in times of Solidarity and concerned the issue of the subject. With his rhetorical question, who might be the subject of changes in Poland, when the impoverishment caused by inefficient socialism only generates populist solidarity? And coincidentally his attack of the supporters of “the paper revolution” (including myself) demanding the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the constitution, for example during the crisis in Bydgoszcz in the spring of ‘81. The driving force behind the changes, he claimed, was to be will, and not law. His vision focussed on the transformation of society, and eliciting the “proper existence” and the type of conflict which may result in the transformation of society, conducive to reforms. In the late 80’s, as a prime minister, his
support went to the capitalists and their participation in the ownership, which would create an interest in system change (Staniszkis, 2010).

Therefore, when I use the term “Bolshevism” with respect to PiS, I mean the node of this type of beliefs, also supported today by Vladimir Putin.

**Bibliography**


*Dictionnaire historique et critique*. (1695). Amsterdam.


